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Economic theory generally considers competition and competitive environ-
ments as desirable. Competition helps improve the functioning of markets,
it fosters innovation, it guarantees efficiency by forcing firms to produce at
lowest possible costs, it encourages highest effort among employees within a
firm and it reduces possibilities of discriminatory behaviour of employers as
to do so would lead to economic potential being unfulfilled. However, this
drive for efficiency tends to pit economic agents against each other in contests
where agents compete against one another to secure economic rents and this
competitive environment may drive agents into enacting illicit behaviour in
order to secure higher rents.
Gilpatric (2011) states that every contest is characterized by rules (sometimes
implicit) that define the difference between acceptable and unacceptable be-
havior. Executives within a firm compete for promotion based on their per-
formance, but accounting fraud, violation of government regulations, or sim-
ply unprofessional or unethical business conduct unacceptable to the firm
may be undertaken by agents in order to gain an illicit advantage over their
competitors and, as such, wherever competition motivates a desirable activ-
ity or productive effort it may also motivate undesirable, and possibly even
prohibited, behaviour.
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This incentive to circumvent the rules is prevalent and rewarding in a wide
variety of markets, within the labour market cheating could entail the will-
ingness of employee to bribe customers or supervisors to increase their posi-
tion in a hierarchical management structure (Krakel, 2007), within education,
individuals colluding in order to increase their ability within academic tests
(McCabe et al, 2001) and within competitive industries, cheating could entail
the effort of individuals within firms sabotaging competitors to gain from the
negative outcome (Harbring et al, 2007).
Broadly speaking, we define cheating as any form of breaking the implicit
or explicit rules of a contest. As such, cheating could feasibly be considered
as a criminal action. The rationality is that the primary objective of cheating
is to avoid punishment from a referee for enacting an illicit choice in order
enhance the payoff received from a contest.
Becker (1968) states that crime could be viewed as a rational act that is chosen
by an individual depending on the benefits and costs involved. Those who
choose to enact illegal actions based upon the cost-benefit analysis may be
regarded as "rational cheaters". Previous economic research has investigated
cheating in education and confirmed that people with low grade point aver-
age (GPA) cheat more than students with high GPA (Kerkvliet and Sigmund,
1999; Bunn et al., 1992) primarily because they have more to gain from doing
so. It has been demonstrated that cheating behaviour within this environ-
ment can be reduced by increasing the costs of being caught (Kerkvliet and
Sigmund, 1999).
One of the most visible examples of where this competitive environment
leads to significant levels of cheating is within the sporting industry. In the
sporting world over recent years, cheating has been an extremely contentious
and lucrative issue. Szymanski (2003) indicates that the structure of sport is
inherently unstable. Players perform and agree to abide by tournament rules
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and regulations to compete for a prize measured in status and money. Due
to this payoff there is an incentive for players to illicitly increase their com-
petitiveness in order to either be accepted into competing within a sport or
to increase their capability in order to win a competition. In the context of
sport, cheating may take many forms, for example match fixing or sabotage.
With issues such as match fixing within the Italian Serie A, spot fixing within
the Indian premier league’s cricket system and research and development
theft within the Formula 1 industry, there is an indication that these incen-
tives are not only prevalent within the market but that attempts to combat
cheating within the industry of competitive sports seems improperly regu-
lated and ineffective. The ubiquitous nature of these problems across several
different sporting competitions does seem to indicate that there is still an in-
centive for competitors to cheat across all sectors of the industry despite the
best attempts of anti-doping authorities. As such, theory suggests that if the
opportunity for cheating arises for competitors in a sporting industry, it will
be exploited by players and could lead to a situation that would represent
market failure within the industry.
According to Preston and Szymanski (2005) ‘Doping has probably been the
biggest single problem relating to ‘cheating’ for sports administrators’. Dop-
ing involves the illicit solicitation of non-therapeutic uses of legal substances,
illegal substances and drugs to artificially increase their capability to compete
within a competitive environment and allow for an “unfair” advantage over
other competitors within the same industry. (Dilger, frick and Tolsdorf, 2007)
Since the 1930’s, progressive advances in synthetic drugs has led to a direct
link between the consumption of performance enhancing substances and in-
creased levels of success within the sporting market of the doper. Due to the
extreme success of such methods, advances within the doping industry have
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been significant and the range of prospective substances and therapies avail-
able to prospective cheaters has enhanced dramatically. Dopers now have the
chance to employ highly advanced substances (such as Stimulants, Diuret-
ics and masking agents) and/or highly advanced biochemical enhancements
(such as the increase in oxygen transfer through blood doping or chemical
and physical manipulation through gene therapy). Doping in sport can be
appropriated as a proxy for cheating as to better understand the decisions of
individuals adopting illicit activity within markets.
One of the most relevant recent examples of the use of performance enhanc-
ing drugs was the actions of Lance Armstrong, former seven time Tour de
France winner and figurehead of competitive road cycling, disgraced by re-
cent revelations surrounding his involvement in doping practices. Further-
more, additional successful professional road cyclists such as Tour de France
winners Tyler Hamilton and Floyd Landis, Giro D’Italia winner Ivan Basso
and winner of all three major tours Alberto Contador have all been convicted
of anti-doping violations in the pursuit of success. However, these high pro-
file cases only represent the most visible aspect of doping within the sport
of road cycling. In fact, over 65 different positive cases of doping within the
industry have been reported since 2007, only three winners of the last fifteen
Tour de France competitions have not been banned for utilizing performance
enhancing drugs and the highest finish for a rider never implicated in doping
controversies between the years of 1998-2006 was fourth.
In addition to the actions of competitive road cyclists, systemic state spon-
sored doping regimes have been uncovered within the Russian Olympic team
prior to the 2016 Rio Olympics. According to the McLaren Report (2016) be-
tween 2011 and 2015, Russia’s Ministry of Sport, the Centre of Sports Prepa-
ration of the National Teams of Russia, the Federal Security Service (FSB)
and the WADA-accredited laboratory in Moscow had conspired to operate
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for the protection of doped Russian athletes by providing a state-directed
fail-safe which allowed for a "disappearing positive methodology" to remove
positive tests from being observed in a conservative estimate of 643 positive
cases across multiple sporting disciplines. The method included removing
sealed, tamper-proof urine tests and removing the substances within to be
replaced with non-contaminated substances without breaking the seal on the
tamper proof security bottles. So, despite increases in funding available for
anti-doping authorities, increases in the complexity of monitoring of athletes
and additional punitive measures for athletes that violate doping rules, the
utilisation of illicit substances and therapies has remained a common phe-
nomenon in the sporting world.
Since the introduction of the World Anti Doping Agency (WADA) in 1999,
there has been an effort to harmonize policies across all sports in order to
allow for a standardized procedure for monitoring and testing of individu-
als. Yet, this action to harmonizing policies to create a uniform policy, as to
counter-act the use of performance enhancing substances and their impact
upon competition. However, this approach may not be entirely effective.
Waddington & Smith (2009) note that the patterns of drug use varies con-
siderably from sport to sport, dependent upon the characteristics required
of an athlete to be successful in that particular market. A single anti-doping
policy may not be sufficient to eliminate the use of performance enhancing
substances, but rather a number of policies, based upon a sport-by-sport ap-
proach may be more effective.
By the end of the 1990’s there was perception of a lack of co-ordinated re-
search policy, especially with regard to new analytic methods and little had
been done to promote anti-doping activities on an international level (Catlin
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et al, 2008). This had led to a significant advantage for competitors who at-
tempted to use doping techniques. Individual competitors could take advan-
tage of arbitrage within a single sporting market due to the vast differences in
testing standards throughout the world. There was a belief that if there was
an ability to the harmonize the vastly divergent rules and regulations regard-
ing anti-doping testing and legislation and implementing a uniform code of
conduct, monitoring and punishment across all sporting markets then there
would be an increase in the effectiveness of anti-doping efforts.
Whilst much vaunted Anti-Doping Administration & Management System
(ADAMS) system and ’Whereabouts’ testing procedure has lead to a dra-
matic increase in the capability of anti-doping agencies to monitor their ath-
letes and the introduction of a characterization of cheaters that distinguishes
between those who are "unintentional cheaters", those who fall foul of dop-
ing rules through the actions of other agents and "real cheaters" who receive
far harsher punitive measures, the approach undertaken by anti-doping au-
thorities still seems to be an adversarial one and this type of adversarial ap-
proach towards athletes may not lead to a complete eradication of doping
from sporting contests. There may well still be a incentive for agents to uti-
lize doping procedures, techniques and substances if there is no element of
self-policing within the industry and a change in norms of competition.
1.1 Outline
Houlohan (2002) states that even though massive investment into research
and development and detection of performance enhancing drugs has been
undertaken as a preventative measure relatively little is known as to how
competitors start taking drugs, the circumstances that arise for an athlete to
start taking drugs or how drug use varies by sport, gender, age or region and,
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as such, doping remains in almost every competitive field. In recent years
influential sportsmen and women in American football, baseball, tennis, as-
sociation football and Athletics have been implicated in doping scandals in
one form or another.
Lippi (2008) notes that the major challenge of anti-doping policies is the ap-
plication of robust testing that can account for the vast array of extreme bio-
chemical and metabolic heterogeneity of substances used for the purpose of
artificial enhancement. If the testing procedures of regulators are outpaced
by the introduction of new, enhanced substances and methods of introducing
foreign substances then the “integrity” of sporting competition is at risk (Az-
zazy, Mansour & Christenson, 2005). Therefore if there is no adequate ability
for the regulator to monitor all sets of possible actions that are available to
the competitors within the industry then, given the conclusions of Daumann
(2003), competitors will take any possible method of artificial enhancement.
If the relatively hard-line approach undertaken by Anti-doping authorities
has not lead to the eradication of doping within the sporting industry, then
we need to understand why not. In order to do that, we need to provide
a comprehensive expected utility model that incorporates the benefits and
costs of undertaking doping techniques and also attempting to understand
if the effect competition has upon the level of doping within the sporting
industry.
Doping in sport is relatively unique in the sense that it seems to benefit nei-
ther spectators of the sport, consumers of the sport or the agents involved
in the long-term. Tax evasion, for instance, is a conflict between those who
can gain from under-reporting their income and those who benefit from in-
creased government spending. Similarly, cyber-crime is a conflict between
those who can gain from having your credit-card details and those who want
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to minimize fraud. In both these examples there is a relatively clear distinc-
tion between winners and losers. Doping in sport, however, provides a sce-
nario where nobody seems to gain.
According to Waddington and Smith (2009) spectators and sponsors don’t
like doping due to its ability to distort "natural" competition and reduce the
value of the competition as a whole. The sporting authorities don’t like dop-
ing as it leads to a mis-allocation of resources and cases where those who
"should" win do not. Pharmaceutical companies have little to gain from dop-
ing as the incorrect (or in cases, correct) application of their substances and
therapies lead towards negative health effects for those competing and, per-
haps most importantly of all, athletes consistently say they would prefer no
doping scenarios.
This is not to deny that some people do gain from doping, such as black-
market smugglers that infiltrate supply networks and sell illicit substances to
individuals who wish to benefit from illegally enhanced capabilities. But, the
gainers seem so few that they cannot possibly offer a plausible explanation
for why the use of drugs is as widespread as it seems. Not only, therefore, is
doping a problem it seems to be a paradoxical one.
With this in mind, in order to reduce the incidence of cheating and doping,
we first have to understand the individual decision making of each rational
athlete when deciding to go against the laws of sport by using a doping sub-
stance or technique. We need to outline the different sporting contexts in
which a doping decision can be analyzed, in terms of expected utility and
strategic behaviour, in order to understand what potential mechanisms can
be levied against individuals who are incentivized to use a doping decision.
In Chapter 2 we outline a generalized model of cheating in sport and focus on
specific strategic and behavioural aspects of the model in order to understand
why individuals may rationally decide to enact a doping decision, despite
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the inherent costs involved, in order for us to have an understanding of what
must be addressed from a policy perspective.
In addition to understanding the benefits and costs of rational agents enact-
ing a doping decision within sport, we must also look at the relatively unique
framework of sporting competition.
When observing sporting competition, the “rational cheater model” would
suggest that the higher the level of competition (i.e. the higher the bene-
fit/payoff derived for having an outcome ’better’ than other economic agents)
the more cheating we should observe and as such the usage of a cheating
mechanism should be seen as more of a continuum rather than a discrete
element and by construction. Furthermore, these mechanisms can say noth-
ing about the interplay between doping decisions and effort portrayed by
athletes.
Frank and Cook (1995) argue that people in higher positions of certain fields
are disproportionately rewarded, which heightens the level of competition
and generates a “winner-take-all” outcome where many people compete for
prizes without a realistic chance of obtaining them and may decide to en-
act illicit decisions in order to enhance their chances of gaining these posi-
tions. So whilst cheating is legal and ethical quandary, it may also lead to the
mis-allocation of resources to individuals whom, through mere effort alone,
would not hold the capability to attain such rents and its successful applica-
tion is a direct incentive for individuals to subvert the rules and regulations
of a market.
Whilst There has been literature that focuses upon strategic interaction and
a growing body of literature that uses game theory to analyze doping in
sport, However, the focus seems to be placed upon looking at doping and
effort mechanisms in combination through contest theory (e.g. Krakel 2007,
Gilpatric 2011, Ryvkin 2013, Mohan and Hazari 2016).
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Whilst Contest theory can allow us to observe outcomes within an all-pay
framework it does tend to have specific functional forms (e.g. Krakel 2007,
Gilpatric 2011) or strong assumptions such as homogeneity (Ryvkin 2013) are
necessary to obtain results, which does present a challenge to obtain a flexible
approach that can yield general insight for policy design.
To provide the tractability lacking in current literature, within chapter 3 we
consider a two stage game in which players first choose how much to dope
and then choose how much effort to exert in training. The combination of
ability, doping and effort determine a player’s score. Players with the highest
score win prizes (where we allow that there may be more than one prize)
and because the doping and effort costs are sunk and those with the highest
scores win we have an all pay auction. This will help complement the current
literature surrounding contest theory and provide a point from which policy
may be drawn.
1.1.1 Competition and framing
Haugen (2004) categorizes the issue of performance enhancing substances
as a two player game where there are homogeneous players competing for
a prize. Within the construct of the game there is a dichotomous choice of
doping which, if enacted, leads to a fixed increase in the capability of the
player. Analysis of the two player game indicates that the structure of the
game is similar to that of a prisoner’s dilemma. Players within the game ap-
ply their ability to dope based upon the significant benefits of doping and
the player’s belief surrounding the doping decisions of the opposing player.
Competitors within this game are Pareto optimal in a situation whereby nei-
ther player takes performance enhancing substances. However, due to infor-
mation asymmetry between players regarding doping decisions and payoff
comparisons, both players take the additional benefit but also bear the costs
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of doping. These costs include future discounted health costs, costs of pro-
curement, the costs of norm infringement and the expected probability of
being caught weighted by the expected cost of punishment.
In the models that follow the interpretation of doping suggested by Hau-
gen (2004) a competitor will utilize any form of illicit advantage if there is
an overall expected utility gain from doing so. Unless there is a direct eco-
nomic incentive to not cheat, competitors will. This economic disincentive
may come in the form of a cost attributed to eliciting the action of cheating or
a reward for not implementing any form of cheating strategy. The methods
of deterrence that are currently being utilized can be considered consistent
with what would be expected from analyzing a standard economic model of
cheating.
In order to correct this element of market failure, there is a general accep-
tance that the presence of a strict exogenous regulatory body is required.
The role of the regulator within these models is to decrease the overall level
of expected utility gain of individuals within the market by actively dis-
incentivizing the usage of illicit techniques. Theoretically, an increase in the
level of punishment leads to an additional cost placed upon the individual
competing within the market and can be considered as a direct disincentive
for competitors and leads to a decrease in expected utility for individuals
utilizing illicit substances and therapies within the industry. Additionally,
an increase in the level or effectiveness of monitoring within the industry
increases the probability of an individual who utilizes illicit substances or
therapies within the industry being caught and punished for their actions
and therefore leads to a similar effect upon expected utility.
Regulatory bodies within this framework must therefore undertake strong
methods of deterrence such as increases in the monitoring of competitors be-
haviour and introductions of harsh punishment mechanisms in an attempt to
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reduce the expected utility gain to the point where individuals would be un-
willing to dope in order to sustain a no-doping equilibrium in the long-term.
As such, there has been a significant increase in the application of policing
and regulation within the sporting world based upon a “punitive law and
order approach” that seeks to uncover and punish individuals that enact
cheating and doping decisions within a competitive sporting environment.
Under this approach, regulators have increased their use of extensive and in-
trusive techniques in order to detect doping and cheating within the industry
and then used strict punishments that eliminate individuals who use dop-
ing procedures from competition for extended periods of time (Waddington
Smith, 2009).
Because of this, the response to the rapid escalation of individuals utilizing
illicit materials by Anti-doping agencies within sport has taken an extremely
adversarial approach. Generally, after major doping crisis’ there is an in-
crease in the punishment and monitoring mechanisms in an attempt to de-
crease the level of doping within the industry. The most recent example of
which is the formation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in 1999.
WADA was created as a direct response to the uncovering of large scale dop-
ing within the Tour de France, attempted to harmonize the separate rules and
regulations surrounding doping around the world under one unified organi-
zation, increase the level of monitoring of individuals competing in sport and
effectively punish competitors who were caught using performance enhanc-
ing techniques. Since its formulation WADA has employed more advanced
doping techniques and instigated better coordinated testing procedures than
preceding organizations.
Nagin (2002) investigated cheating behavior in a firm and found that while
reductions in monitoring (i.e. measures that track employee’s location and
activity) have increased shirking from some employees, other employee’s do
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not respond according to the “rational cheater model” and continue to work
at the same level as under the previous monitoring regime. Another area in
which “cheating” has been investigated is tax evasion. Franzoni (2000) points
out that whilst the empirical research in this area is inconclusive, expected
punishment appears to negatively affect the level of tax evasion in a country.
Whilst the incentive to cheat is built into a competitive reward structure, be-
havioural and psychological motives may lead towards increased cheating
under competitive environments because competition emphasises the impor-
tance of personal success. As a result, Individuals may find themselves less
bound to adhere to standards and social norms of fairness and use cheating
in order to increase their own payoffs.
Eber (2008) indicates that “the only real hope for ending the practise of dop-
ing lies in the norms of fair competition between the athletes”. Recent ad-
vances in behavioural economics suggest the adversarial approach may not
be best for regulating the market. Instead it points towards a more coop-
erative approach which recognises a wider set of incentives and influences
on behaviour than the standard mode. The current methods of attempt-
ing to limit the usage of drugs in sport will not completely eradicate the
usage of more sophisticated doping techniques in the long run and may,
in fact have the inverse effect. As such, there should be a shift in the ac-
tions of anti-doping agencies away from punitive measures towards more
co-operative measures, such as harm reduction and a greater level of self-
regulation within the industry.
Therefore, in order to fully understand why doping decisions are enacted
within a competitive sporting framework in order to reduce the incidence of
them from a policy perspective, we must understand if there are behavioural
effects that may be influencing the level or incidence of doping.
Experimental literature suggests that most people are lie averse (Rosenbaum,
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Billinger and Stieglitz 2014 and Capraro 2018). A key question we must to
address in our work is how an individuals willingness to cheat is influenced
by strategic incentives. In Chapter 4 we explore the effects that incentives
in a contest may have on agents willingness to cheat and whether or not a
reduction in monitoring leads to an increased level of cheating, as we would
expect from expected utility modelling.
Additionally, we need to find whether there are individual or attitudinal dif-
ferences that lead to athletes becoming more willing to engage in dishonest
behaviour and whether cultural and situational influences from the sporting
environment lead to individuals deciding to cheat more than under "normal"
competition.
Most analysis of anti-social and dishonest behaviour in sport has focused on
heterogeneity between athletes or their environment (e.g. coaches or type
of sport). Our objective in Chapter 5 is to explore the complimentary idea
that people behave more dishonestly in a sporting environment than they
do in other environments due to its competitive nature. We argue that there
are various mechanisms an ‘honest person’ can use to justify dishonest be-
haviour in sport.
This approach should give us a relatively full understanding over the strate-
gic elements that go into an individuals choice to elicit a doping decision, al-
low us to give a more generalized version model of doping in sport that can
help form policy that dissuading individuals from eliciting the doping deci-
sion whilst being complementary to current literature, demonstrate whether
or not payoff structures and monitoring have any effect upon reducing the
overall levels of cheating and whether or not simply being within a sporting
environment has a significant impact on whether an individual will decide
to cheat and to what extent.
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Chapter 2
Doping as a discrete choice
2.1 Individual decision making
The underlying question we have to consider in this thesis is why an athlete
would dope, and why they would not. Only if we answer this question can
we unpick the reasons why we have a doping problem and what would help
alleviate it. So, why would someone dope?
In a series of interviews and focus group discussions with athletes, coaches,
and others involved in sport, Mazanov and Huybers (2010) identified the ten
choice factors summarized in Table 2.1. In a follow up study (Huybers and
Mazanov 2012), they estimated the relative strength of each choice factor by
asking a large number of sportspeople hypothetical choice questions about
an athlete called Kim1. The factors that showed up most strongly were ‘quick
fix’ performance enhancements (because of injury or fast track to the top), fi-
nancial gain, health effects, the probability of being caught and the financial
and non-financial consequences of being caught. Interestingly, sources of in-
fluence and information were less important, although the recommendation
of a coach or senior athlete had some effect.
1Survey respondents were given a series of hypothetical scenarios and asked in which
scenario they thought that Kim was most likely to dope.
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TABLE 2.1: Themes, choice factors and descriptions for drug
use. Source, Manazov and Huybers (2010)
Variable Description
1. Expected Performance The objective of using the drug
Outcome e.g. to improve performance
or overcome injury
2. Money Amount The expected Financial gain from
improved performance
3. Money Contingency Contingency in the contract withdrawing
financial gain in case of Doping
About the Drug
4. Source of Influence Member of sports network, such as coach
Sports doctor, competitor or role model
5. Source of Information Information about doping e.g. From
Pharmaceutical company, Medical Journal
or blog
6. Health side effect Expected effect on health
The deterrence system
7. Detection Likelihood of successful detection
8. Prosecution leading Likelihood of successful prosecution
to ban
Consequences if Prosecuted
9. Financial consequences Fine and loss of money
10. Non-financial Other consequences such as public
consequences humiliation
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However, these hypothetical choice experiments and surveys can only tell us
so much. There is much disagreement, for example, about the willingness
of athletes to trade health for performance enhancement. Goldman, found
that 50 percent of surveyed athletes would be willing to take a substance that
guaranteed sporting success even if it led to certain death within five years
(Goldman, Bush and Klatz 1984). This suggests an extreme willingness to
trade health for glory.
The Goldman dilemma has, however, been questioned, and many consider
the 50 percent figure a gross over-estimate (Woolf, Mazanov and Connor
2016). Different surveys also give very different results regarding athletes
assessment and understanding of health risks (e.g. Stelan and Boeckmann
2006 and Lentillon-Kaestner, Hagger and Hardcastle 2012). It is difficult to
unpick what something like expected ‘performance improvement’ actually
means. For instance, Goulet et al. (2010) found that pressure to lose or gain
weight was strongly influential in the decision to dope.
What clearly comes through, however, in all of the studies done on the psy-
chology of doping this is that there are a number of significant factors that
influence the doping decision (Anshel 1991, Overbye, Knudsen, and Pfister
2013, Ntoumanis et al. 2014). Even if we stick to the factors that consistently
come out as very important there is still a complex trade-off between finan-
cial and non financial gains from performance enhancement versus health
risks and the likelihood of being caught. Moreover, there is also very strong
evidence that an individual’s willingness to dope will depend on that indi-
vidual’s gender, personality and moral values (Goulet et al. 2010, Ntouma-
nis et al. 2014). For instance, women seem less likely to dope than men (e.g.
Pitsch and Emrich 2011)
The starting point for economic and game theoretic analysis of the doping de-
cision is that choice can be modelled as a rational weighing up of costs and
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FIGURE 2.1: An equation for the expected utility from doping
benefits (Maennig 2002, see also Strelan and Boeckmann 2003). To illustrate,
we might end up with an equation like that in Figure 2.1. Here we attempt to
capture the incentive to dope of an athlete, who we will call Marion, by ex-
pressing her payoff as a function of some basic primitives. More specifically,
the expected utility from doping. EU(D) is expressed as a weighted sum of
three possible outcomes:
i) Doping works, i.e. the performance gain is as expected, and the athlete is
not caught. In this case their payoff depends on a base salary, S, gain from
performance enhancement,W, and health costs, HC
(ii) Doping does not work and she is not caught. In this case their payoff
depends only on the base salary, S and health costs, HC
(iii) The Player is caught doping. Then their payoff depends on a finan-
cial fine, F, and non-financial punishments NF. These three outcomes are
weighted by the probability of them happening which depends on the prob-
ability doping works, p, and the probability of being caught, q.
Clearly, the equation in Figure 2.1 is, at best, only a highly stylized repre-
sentation of the incentives an athlete may face. For instance, it may be that
the payoff if caught depends on whether doping was successful; the proba-
bility of being caught may depend on the extent of doping; the health costs
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associated with doping may be stochastic; the success of doping may not be
a simple binary outcome but vary from successful, winning gold, to highly
successful, winning gold with a world record time; and so on. Indeed, there
is an almost limitless set of possibilities. Even so, an economic perspective
says that we can gain invaluable insight from studying simple models of
choice. In this regard it is worth highlighting that a guiding principle of eco-
nomic methodology is that a model should be judged on the quality of its
predictions and insight and not on the realism of its assumptions.
If choices are consistent then they can be modelled as if rational, the over-
whelming evidence from a variety of contexts, including doping in sport
(Huybers and Mazanov 2012), is that people’s choices are consistent most
of the time (e.g. Andreoni and Miller 2002). And as Strelan and Boeckmann
(2003) note, the decision to dope is unlikely to be made on a whim. Perfor-
mance enhancement from steroids, EPO, human growth hormone, and so on
requires systematic use of a long period of time. Moreover, the potential con-
sequences of being caught doping are typically life changing. It would be
surprising, therefore, if an athlete were to dope without consciously weigh-
ing up the costs and benefits to some extent.
2.1.1 Role of Strategic Interaction
The previous section has framed sport in terms of an individual athlete mak-
ing a decision to dope. If our interest was in recreational sport, such as an
individual training to improve fitness, then we could stop there. Professional
sport is, however, by its very nature, a competitive process.
Whilst breaking records might be valued to some extent by an individual,
the true value and utility from competition is derived from being ahead of
others. Athletes do not compete within a void, but rather in a competitive
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environment against other agents within a system that extends beyond each
individual agents control.
Consider, for instance, the arguments Lance Armstrong gave to justify his
doping, that it was impossible to compete without doping due to the doping
actions of his competitors, that the action of doping was systemic, endemic
and a natural aspect of competitive road cycling norms and that a competi-
tive Tour de France race would be "impossible" without the additional oxy-
gen benefits of using either Erythropoietin (EPO), Blood transfusions mid-
race or any other element that increases Oxygen transfer rates from red blood
cells to muscles. Now we might discount Armstrong’s comments to some ex-
tent as ex-post rationalization however it is clear that the behaviour of others
is inextricably linked with attitudes to doping. For instance, we might have
the athlete who dopes in order to keep a level playing field with other dop-
ers or we might have the athlete who dopes in order to get ahead. A third
characterization of player would be an athlete who do not dope but fear that
they will lose out to dopers. Beliefs about the actions of others are therefore
not only likely to influence doping decisions but other aspects of strategy as
well.
Many of the primitives in figure 2.1 depend on the actions of others, such
as the probability of detection. One primitive, namely the probability that
doping will be performance enhancing, p, almost certainly will depend on
the actions of others. This needs to be taken into account as after all an athlete
has very little control over what others do and so she can essentially take p as
given. One difficulty with this approach is the underlying assumption that
people must act on their beliefs and not necessarily objective reality.
Under an expected utility framework, rational agents will solicit any illicit ac-
tion that yields a positive economic outcome, based upon the benefit gained
by the utilization of illegal techniques and substances weighted by the risk of
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being caught and punished by regulatory bodies overseeing the competition
and correspondingly, any action that will lead to an economic deficit would
not be solicited by a rational economic agent.
2.2 The prisoner’s dilemma
If an athlete knowingly takes performance enhancing drugs then he clearly
has some reason for doing so and within most Game theoretical models we
assume that this is due to the expected utility derived from making such
a decision. Despite athletes, sponsors, fans and pharmaceutical companies
receiving a higher payoff overall in a competitive environment with no dop-
ing, athletes may decide to dope in order to maximize their own individual
payoff.
The insight that doping will emerge even if no one wants is of fundamental
importance because it shows that doping is a social problem. Doping is not
(solely) a consequence of individual athletes being ‘immoral’ or ‘cheats’, but,
instead, a consequence of the basic incentive structures within sport. Given
the fundamental importance of this insight we shall spend some time build-
ing the argument.
Consider a 2x2 game amongst two players competing to win an event, each of
them independently has the opportunity to enact a doping decision in order
to improve their chance of success. To keep things simple let us suppose these
are the only two athletes capable of winning the competition. Furthermore,
suppose that doping is a discrete choice. If we use this assumption, then
there are the four possible outcomes depicted in Table 2.2. we have assumed
that if both athletes do the same thing then they have an equal chance of
winning. While, if one athlete dopes when the other does not then victory is
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TABLE 2.2: Outcomes in a Two Player Doping game
Player 2
No Dope Dope
No Dope Equal Chance P2 Wins
Player 1
Dope P1 Wins Equal Chance
TABLE 2.3: Payoffs in a Two Player Doping game
Player 2
No Dope Dope




Dope W − c, 0 W2 − c, W2 − c
guaranteed for the doper. Note that this means doping increases the chance
of winning by 50 percentage points.
Assume that there is a payoff value attributed to each of the four possible
outcomes. So, let W denote the prize for winning, which might include the
monetary prize, increased sponsorship etc. and let c define the cost of dop-
ing, which could include health costs, the probability of being caught for en-
acting a doping decision and the financial penalties associated if caught. We
then obtain the game depicted in Table 2.32. For example, if Player 1 dopes
and Player 2 does not then Player 1 is sure of winning the Prize, W, but pays
a cost, c, and has net payoff W− c. Similarly, if both dope then both have a 50
percent chance of the prize W and both pay cost c so have net payoff = W2 − c
2Strictly speaking this is not a complete description of the game because it ignores the role
of ‘nature’ in deciding who wins if both do the same thing. This, though, does not change
equilibrium predictions.
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To analyze the game in Table 2.3 we need to look at the incentives of Player 1
and Player 2.
Consider Player 1. Suppose that Player 1 believes Player 2 will not dope,
Player 1 has the decision to either Dope (and receive payoff W2 ) or decide
against doping (and receive the payoff W − c). Player 1 does better to Dope
if and only if;




W > 2c (2.2)
In other words, the prize has to be twice the costs of doping, suppose next
that Player 1 believes that Player 2 will Dope. Player 1 can decide to either
Not Dope (and receive payoff of 0) or Dope (and receive payoff of W2 − c).
Again Player 1 does better to dope if and only if W > 2c. Given the symmetry
in the game the incentives for Player 1 and Player 2 are identical. So Player 2
should also decide to dope if and only if W > 2c.
The most interesting case for consideration is where W > 2c and so the prize
for winning is relatively large. If this is the case then irrespective of what
Player 2 does, Player 1 should enact a doping decision and the same is the
case for Player 2.
Both players therefore have a dominant strategy in Doping and suggest a full
doping outcome as the Nash equilibrium in the game.
If both players decide to enact a doping decision then they both receive the
payoff W2 − c. If neither player decides to dope then they receive the payoff
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W
2 . The latter outcome is preferred by rational agents because they avoid
the health costs associated with doping and that the action of doping would
create a dead-weight loss. However, due to the strategic interaction between
the two players, both athletes are incentivized to dope.
The fact athletes dope does not, therefore, imply that they ‘want’ to dope.
We have to look at their strategic incentives. Even though both athletes, in
this game, would prefer they abstain from doping, that it is not an equilib-
rium outcome because the gains from doping are simply too high to ignore.
This trade-off between group and individual incentives gives rise to a social
dilemma.
However, it is important to recognize when analyzing this simplistic varia-
tion of the performance enhancing drug game (Haugen, 2004) we are making
questionable assumptions.
It might be, for instance, that the chances of a positive drug test are less if
both dope. Or, the punishment for doping might be less for an athlete that
does not win. If so, the cost of doping would be less when both dope than
if just one dopes. In this game we assume that both athletes are risk neutral
and that may not be a plausible assumption to make.
2.2.1 Tragedy of the Commons
In the previous section we considered a game with only two athletes. This is
a very useful simplifying assumption but obviously leaves open the crucial
question of what happens if we have many athletes competing for the one
prize. Suppose that there are N > 2 athletes that are capable of competing to
win the prize, W. the assumptions that all athletes are of the same ability and
must make a binary, dope or not dope, decision will remain the same.
Chapter 2. Doping as a discrete choice 25
TABLE 2.4: Payoffs in a Many Player Game
Other
d = 0 d > 0
Dope W − c Wd+1 − c
Player 1’s
Decision
Not Dope Wn 0
The mechanics are not dissimilar from that of the standard game, the athlete
with a strong preference for current period benefits will disregard the health
costs to use illicit techniques and if all players dope then there is no change
in advantages from the base game. Additionally, Haugen (et al, 2013) repli-
cated the conditions of the performance enhancing drugs game proposed by
Haugen (2004) across n-players.
The payoff to an athlete will depend on the number (or proportion) of other
athletes who dope as summarized in Table 2.5. If Player 1 Dopes, they pay a
cost, c, and is in with a chance of winning the prize. The chance of winning
will depend upon how many others decide to enact a doping decision.
For example, in the previous section we stated that there was other player,
Player 2, and if Player 2 decided to enact a doping decision, d = 1, then
Player 1 had a 50% chance of winning. The more athletes dope the higher
the level of Doping (d) the less chance Player 1 has to win the Prize. If Player
1 does not dope then the only chance to win is if nobody else in the game
dopes.
Let us start the analysis by asking if it can be an equilibrium for no athlete to
dope. Setting d = 0, Player 1 will have an incentive to dope if
W − c > W
n
(2.3)
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) > c (2.4)
The key thing to note is that the more athletes there are, the larger n is, then
the more likely this condition will be satisfied. If n is sufficiently large, then
the condition reduces to merely saying that the prize for winning should
be bigger than the cost of doping. Thus, the more athletes there are, the
harder it is to sustain doping free sport. The intuition for this result is simple
enough in that more athletes make it less likely an athlete will win and so the
potential gain from doping is higher.
Consider next if it can be an equilibrium for all athletes to dope. Setting




This is a much tougher condition to satisfy. So, the more athletes there are
the less likely we will end up with every athlete doping. Again, the intuition
for this result is that more doping athletes make it less likely doping will pay
off.
So far, we have seen that the more athletes there are the less likely it is an
equilibrium for no one to dope or for everyone to dope. The likely outcome,
therefore, is that some dope and some do not. To be more precise we can find




This can be re-written as





The interesting thing to note about this condition is that it does not depend
on the number of athletes. Instead, the predicted number of dopers depends
solely on the relative trade-off between the prize and cost of doping. The
proceeding discussion shows that there are natural limits to doping. In par-
ticular, we should not expect every athlete to dope. Moreover, the bigger the
prize and the lower the cost of doping the more are predicted to dope.
However a social dilemma still remains. Suppose that we end up with the
equilibrium level of doping, d?, which defines the optimal level of doping
in the game given the parameters. Anyone who refuses to dope at this level
has an expected payoff of zero as they hold no expectation of winning the
prize and anyone who decides to dope has an expected payoff of zero. In
this case, all of the potential gains from winning are eroded away by the
costs of doping. This is not a coincidence but an inevitable consequence of
the incentives athletes face to compete.
If all athletes chose to not dope then each athlete would have expected payoff
W
n > 0. This, similar to the previous sections analysis of a simple Prisoners
dilemma in a 2 player game, would indicate that there is a better outcome
than a d? level of doping. So, again we have a social dilemma in the sense
that the equilibrium outcome is worse for everyone than can be achieved if
doping is eliminated. If athletes could somehow commit to not doping then
it would be in their interests to do so.
This particular dilemma is an example of the tragedy of the commons in
which a ‘common resource’ is over-exploited (Bird and Wagner 1997). In this
instance the common resource is performance enhancing drugs. Each athlete
has an incentive to use that resource even though its use imposes a negative
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externality on other athletes.
However, the nature of a ’many athlete’ setting does warrant some discus-
sion. We have assumed that only the winner gains. In reality, we expect that
finishing second is better than finishing third, and so on. This will, however,
depend on the sport in question. In athletics, for instance, winning the 100m
at the Olympics counts for a lot more than winning at the Diamond League
meeting in Zurich, or similar; the focus, therefore, is on one ‘big’ event. In
most sports, however, there are multiple opportunities to gain and this can
smooth the distribution to some extent. With regard to this type of analysis,
The consequences of multiple prizes were explored by Haugen, Nepusz and
Petroczi (2013).
Essentially, if the relative gains from winning diminish the further down the
pack an athlete is then the analysis of this section holds true. We just need to
find the cut-off marginal gain that is sufficient to induce doping.
2.2.2 Asymmetric Ability
Until now we have assumed that all athletes have the same ability. Clearly,
we need to consider a more realistic setting where abilities differ. In order to
illustrate this asymmetry in ability we return to a 2-player setting.
If p denotes the probability of Player 1 winning then 1− p denotes the prob-
ability of Player 2 winning. Therefore the expected payoff of player 1 if nei-
ther player is doping equals pW and that of player 2 is equal to (1− p)W.
For simplicity let us assume that if both dope then the probability of Player 1
winning is still p.
If neither athlete dopes then Player 1 has a probability p of winning the Prize,
W. Implicitly we assumed previously that p = 0.5. If we allow for Player 1 to
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TABLE 2.5: Payoffs in a Asymmetric 2-player Game
Player 2
Not Dope Dope
d = 0 d > 0
Not Dope pW, (p− δ2)W,
(1− p)W (1− p + δ2)W − c
Player 1
Dope (p + δ1)W − c, pW − c,
(1− p− δ1)W (1− p)W − c
have more ability in the competition than Player 2 then p > 0.5 and if Player
2 is more able in the competition than Player 1 then p < 0.5.
If one athlete dopes and the other does not, given that the athletes are of
different ability, it is almost inevitable that the consequences of doping will
differ. Consider first the case where Player 1 decides to dope and Player 2
does not.
Let δ1 denote the amount by which the probability of Player 1 winning in-
creases. In which case Player 1 will win with a probability p + δ1 and Player
2 wins with a Probability 1 − p − δ1. In this case, the expected payoff for
Player 1 is (p + δ1)W − c and that of Player 2 is (1− p− δ1)W
Consider next the case where Player 2 dopes and Player 1 does not. Let δ2
denote the amount by which the probability of Player 2 winning increases.
In this case Player 1 will win with a probability p− δ2 and Player 2 wins with
a Probability 1− p + δ2. Table 2.5 summarizes the relevant payoffs3
The game depicted in Table 2.4 is clearly more complex. First, we must check
to see if the main findings hold true and if it is still a Nash equilibrium for
both Players to Dope. If Player 2 dopes then it is in Player 1’s best interest to
dope when
pW − c > (p− δ2)W (2.8)
3Note that we implicitly assumed previously that δ1 = δ2 = 0.5
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this can be re-arranged as
δ2W > c (2.9)
Similarly for Player 2, if Player 1 dopes then it is in the best interest of Player
2 to dope when
(1− p)W − c > (1− p− δ1)W (2.10)
.
This re-arranges to
δ1W > c (2.11)
Therefore it is a Nash equilibrium for both athletes to dope if
δ1W, δ2W > c (2.12)
To gain further insight assume that Player 2 does not Dope. In this case it is
in Player 1’s best interest to dope if (p + δ1)W > pW. This is equivalent to
δ1W > c.
Similarly if player 1 does not Dope then it is in Player 2’s interest to Dope if
(1− p + δ2)W − c > (1− p)W which reduces to δ1W > c.
Therefore if condition 2.12 it satisfied then the unique Nash equilibrium of
the game is for both players to Dope. Clearly, as with the previous examples,
both players would be better off if they did not dope and we obtain the same
social dilemma of doping if the gains from doping are sufficiently high.
However, the preceding discussion has not really touched on the issue of
asymmetric ability. Let’s consider a situation whereby Player 1 is a lot better
than Player 2. For instance, assume that p = 0.9 and as such there is a 90%
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chance of player 1 winning in a "fair" contest with no doping involved. Cru-
cially, Player 1 cannot benefit much by unilaterally doping, we know that at
most Player 1 can, at best, improve their chance of wining by a maximum of
10%, δ1 < 10%. However, Player 2 has a lot to gain through the elicitation of
a doping regime. If, for example, the doping decision leads to a 50% chance
of winning, as opposed to the 10% in a fair contest, then there is a possible
40% improvement, δ2 = 0.4.
In general, asymmetric ability is likely to lead to a big discrepancy between
δ1 and δ2. In particular if Player 1 is significantly better than Player 2 then we
may end up with the situation
δ2W > c > δ1W (2.13)
Indicating that Player 2 can unilaterally benefit from doping whilst Player 1
does not.
In this setting there does not exist a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. To
appreciate this point we just need to consider the four possible outcomes. If
Player 1 does not dope then, because δ2W > c, Player 2 will have an incentive
to dope. So it is not a Nash Equilibrium for either player to dope. However,
if Player 2 does dope then layer 1 has an incentive to dope as δ2W > c. In this
case, Player 1 has an incentive to dope in order to ’Wipe out’ the competitive
advantage that Player 2 would gain from Doping. Therefore, it is not a Nash
Equilibrium for Player 2 to dope and Player 1 not to. Continuing this logic
it is not possible for either player to dope nor is it a Nash equilibrium for
Player 1 to dope and Player 2 to not.
In the absence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium we can look for a mixed
strategy Nash equilibria In equilibrium Player 1 needs to randomize their
doping decisions in such a way that Player 2 is indifferent to between doping
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and Not doping. Let q1 denote the probability of Player 1 doping we need.





δ2 − δ1 (2.15)





δ2 − δ1 (2.16)
One interesting thing to take from this analysis is that the equilibrium prob-
abilities do not depend on relative ability, as measured by p. All that matters
is the amount that each athlete can gain from doping, δ1 and δ2. This is gener-
ally going to be true. In particular, an athlete’s incentive to dope will depend
on what that athlete, and competitors, can gain from doping. It is only indi-
rectly going to depend on relatively ability per se.
In equilibrium, the expected payoff to Player 1 if they do not dope is
pW(1− q2) + (p− δ2)Wq2 = pW − δ2Wq2 < pW (2.17)
Recall that in Equilibrium Player 1 is indifferent between doping and not
doping. We therefore know that Player 1’s expected Payoff is less than if
Player 1 and Player 2 did not dope. Similarly in terms of Player 2, their
expected Payoff if they did not decide to dope is
(1− p)W(1− q1)+ (1− p− δ1)Wq1 = (1− p)W− δ1Wq1 < (1− p)W (2.18)
In this case, Player 2 would also be worse off than if both players had decided
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not to dope. Thus, even though this game is far removed from the prisoners
Dilemma from which we began analysis, the same basic result remains, both
players would be better off if doping did not exist.
2.2.3 Layers of Doping
In the proceeding discussions we have seen that some athletes may dope
while others do not. But, is it the dopers that always win? The simple answer
is no. To get a first insight on this issue let us look again at the asymmetric
ability game of Table 2.5 . What we are going to look at is the probability
that Player 2 dopes, Player 1 does not dope, and yet Player 1 still wins. This
is easiest to look at with a specific example and so suppose that p = 0.9,
δ1 = 0.05, δ2 = 0.4 and cW = 0.35
Note that Player 1 has a 90% chance of winning a fair contest, p=0.9. And,
more importantly, still has a 50% chance of winning an unfair contest, δ2 =
0.5. With this in mind let us look at the equilibrium outcome The equilibrium







The Probability that Player 1 does not dope (from equation 2.11) is:







So the probability that Player 2 dopes and Player 1 dopes is approximately
0.74. Recall if this happens there is a 50% chance that Player 1 wins. The
probability that Player 2 dopes, Player 1 does not Dope and Player 1 still
wins is therefore around 37%
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The preceding example shows that doping and winning need not go in tan-
dem. The reason for this is that doping is driven by relative and not absolute
gain. Player 2 has an incentive to dope because it dramatically increases his
chances of winning. He is, though, still unlikely to win. This example il-
lustrates the more general principle that doping decisions are about relative
gain and loss and not winning per se. This is a crucial point and so we shall
provide another example to illustrate the point.
Consider again a situation where there are a number of exceptional athletes
and a number of average athletes. This time, however, suppose that an av-
erage athlete cannot beat an exceptional athlete even if the average athlete
dopes (and the exceptional athlete does not). Is there any incentive for the
average athlete to dope? If the only prize up for grabs is a gold medal then
an average athlete does indeed have no incentive to dope. But, in the world
of professional sport the gold medal is unlikely to be the only prize on offer.
If there are m Olympic places and nB < m exceptional athletes then excep-
tional athletes are guaranteed being on the Olympic team and can just fo-
cus on the gold medal. Applying the logic of Section 2.1.2 we would ex-
pect d?B =
W
c − 1 to dope, where W is the relative gain from winning the
gold medal. Average athletes are in a competition for the nB −m remaining
Olympic places. Suppose that there are nL average athletes and the relative
gain from getting a place on the team is Z. Then we can extend the analysis
of Section 2.1.2 to cover this case. The only thing we need to change is that
now more than one athlete can win the prize.
The relative payoffs for doping versus not doping are summarized in Table
2.5. If the number of average athletes who dope is less than the number of
places up for grabs then all dopers get a place and non-dopers have a chance.
If the number of average athletes who dope is more than the number of places
up for grabs then only dopers have a chance of a place. In equilibrium, Player
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d2 < nB −m− 1 d2 > nB −m− 1
Not Dope Z− c Z nB−md2+1
P2
Dope Z− nB−m−δ2n2−δ2 0










Note that it is entirely plausible the number of average athletes who dope
could exceed the number of exceptional athletes who dope. In particular, we
only need that Z(nB − m) > W meaning that the total gain from athletes
getting a place on the team exceeds the prize from winning.
We see again that it is not only winners with an incentive to dope. Indeed, in
this example there may be little incentive for exceptional athletes to dope be-
cause they are guaranteed a comfortable living, have little chance of winning
the gold, and stand to gain little from doping.
Average athletes, by contrast, may have a strong incentive to dope because
doping might be their only way of securing a future as a professional ath-
lete. This example reiterates the point that the potential gains from doping
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are what we need to consider when attempting to devise policy to reduce
the level of doping within the market and that the gains from doping may
be larger the further down the pack we go. One thing to appreciate at this
stage is the potential for ‘layers of doping’ where doping occurs at critical
ability thresholds, whether that be winning the gold or making a place on
the Olympic team.
2.3 Norms of Fair Play
The focus of this chapter will now start to shift from one of understanding
the incentives to dope to that of trying to reduce doping. Naturally, this
will lead us to look at the potential for the intervention of regulators and
doping authorities. We shall begin by looking at whether norms of fair play
can be enough alone to deter doping. Cycling, for instance, provides one
positive example. A picture of almost universal doping in the peloton that
changed after the Festina and Puerto scandals (Lentillon-Kaestner, Hagger
and Hardcastle 2012). This appears to follow from a culture shift rather than
any change in direct incentives. For instance, cyclists still underestimated the
health risks of doping. One possibility is that athletes simply dislike to dope
because it is seen as a form of lying or cheating. Then the costs to doping, c,
should include a psychological cost of doping. The analysis we have done so
far in this chapter, would, however, remain unaltered.
One possibility is that athletes simply dislike to dope because it is seen as a
form of lying or cheating. Then the costs to doping, c, should include a psy-
chological cost of doping. The analysis we have done so far in this chapter,
would, however, remain unaltered. In particular, the ratio cW will still be cru-
cial, we just recognize that c might be somewhat larger. It is possible that an
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athlete would be so averse to cheating that this tips the balance towards not-
doping. However, the athlete would have to be incredibly averse to lying if
they are willing to forego an Olympic gold model simply because they have
lie aversion. There is some evidence of Lie Aversion outlined by Waddington
and Smith (2008) however we would typically assume that individuals may
be willing to lie for a price, which will be covered more in Chapter 4 & 5.
Realistically, therefore, it seems that lie aversion, of itself, is unlikely to count
for very much in the world of professional sport.
A more nuanced possibility is explored by Eber (2008). The key idea here is
that an athlete experiences a psychological cost if he dopes and others do not,
but does not experience any cost if others dope. This trade-off recognizes the
potential for norms of fair play. In particular, if there is a norm of not-doping
then an athlete may feel negative if he deviates from that norm. To work
through the implications let us return to the prisoners dilemma game with
which we began the chapter but build in the notion of a norms.
The basic cost of doping remains c, however we now say that if Player 1
decides to dope and Player 2 does not then Player 1 will receive a ’guilt’
size of β1 as the player is aware that they have received an illicit advantage
over the other player through cheating. At the same time, Player 2 receives
’annoyance’, α2, as they know that player 2 has enacted a doping decision to
gain victory. Similarly if Player 2 decides to Dope and Player 1 decides not
to, then Player 2 experiences ’guilt’ and Player 1 experiences ’annoyance’
In terms of Nash Equilibrium, it is still a Nash equilibrium for both players
to dope (if 2c > W). However it may also be a Nash equilibrium for both to
not dope, If Player 2 does not dope then it is optimal for Player 1 to dope if.
W − c− β1 < W2 (2.23)
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TABLE 2.7: Prisoners dilemma game with guilt and annoyance
Player 2
No Dope Dope
No Dope W2 ,
W
2 −α1, W − c− β2
Player 1






Provided that both β1 and β2 are sufficiently large then a norm of non-doping
is possible to be sustained and in this case the game moves from being a
Prisoner’s dilemma outcome to one of co-ordination.
Although this is a promising outcome, there is reason for skepticism sur-
rounding the capability of all athletes to co-ordinate upon a non-doping equi-
librium. Firstly, we need all athletes to stick to the norms. If, for instance,
Player 2 does not feel much guilt from the action of doping, β2 is small, then
they will dope and it is in Player 1’s best interest to also Dope, no matter
how high their own guilt at enacting the decision (β1) is. It seems unlikely
that we can realistically expect all athletes to intrinsically want to stick with
the norm.
There is also another, more strategic, reason to question whether a non-doping
equilibrium will occur, Risk Dominance.
Suppose Player 1 has no idea what Player 2 will choose, then to capture this
complete uncertainty surrounding the action of Player’s 2’s actions we as-
sume they will dope 50% of the time and Not dope 50% of the time. Given
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this assumption, the expected payoff of Player 1 when doping is:
1
2
(W − c− β1) + 12(
W
2



















Thus the expected Payoff from doping is higher than not doping if:
β1 − α1 < W − 2c (2.27)
We would expect that annoyance from cheating exceeds guilt, meaning that
β1 < α1. However, this leads to a reduction to the familiar W > 2c and there-
fore player 1 should decide to dope.
The preceding analysis informs us that the Nash equilibrium where both ath-
letes dope is risk dominant. Basically, doping is the ‘less risky’ option be-
cause it gives a higher expected payoff for a wider set of beliefs about what
the other athlete will do. In another sense, not doping is risky because of
the chance the athlete will end up with nothing but annoyance due to the
other player deciding to dope and receiving the payoff α1. We have, there-
fore, a coordination game with a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium, neither
athlete dopes, and a risk dominant Nash equilibrium, both athletes dope.
Fortunately, there is a large amount of experimental evidence as to which
equilibrium is more likely to emerge in this type of game. And the evidence
favours the risk dominant equilibrium being more likely. This again suggests
that a norm of non-doping may be hard to sustain.
This section has painted a somewhat pessimistic view as to whether social
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norms can eliminate doping. What we are arguing is that fairness norms of
themselves are almost certainly not enough to eliminate doping. It is simply
asking too much for social norms to overcome the huge incentives to dope.
Moreover, social norms can actually increase the incentive to dope, such as
the annoyance Player 2 might anticipate they will lose if Player 1 dopes. This
does not mean, however, that social norms are not an important part of the
picture. We have seen that social norms can quite dramatically change the
strategic incentives to dope. If this can be harnessed together with other
interventions then it may be possible to reduce doping.
2.4 Doping Games with Punishment
The basic objective of current anti-doping policy is clearly to test athletes and
punish those caught doping. There are, though, an almost limitless number
of ways in which a punishment policy can work. 4
A benchmark for comparison is a policy in which all athletes have the same
chance of being tested and face the same fine if caught doping. In this case
we can think of each athlete being independently tested with probability h.
If they are tested and have doped then there is probability g the test will be
positive. And if the test is positive they get fine F. The expected punish-
ment of someone who dopes is then hgF. This punishment would be a key
component of the cost of doping c.
To illustrate, Table 2.8 shows what happens if we rewrite the game in Table
2.3 to explicitly take account of the punishment. In this reformulated version
c′ stands for ‘other’ costs such as health costs and the psychological cost of
cheating
4Note that we shall not distinguish, at this point, between financial penalties and non-
financial sanctions, such as media backlash.
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TABLE 2.8: Prisoners dilemma game with Punishment
P2
No Dope Dope
No Dope W2 ,
W
2 0, W − hgF− c′
P1
Dope W − hgF− c′, 0 W2 − hgF− c
′
, W2 − hgF− c′
A standard result in the economics of crime suggests variance between in-
creases in the probability of being caught and level of fine. For instance,
doubling the probability an athlete will test positive gives the same expected
effect as doubling the fine; both double hgF5. This suggests that, given the
difficulties in detecting performance enhance drugs, the easiest and most ef-
fective way to deter doping is to increase the fine for those caught. In this
case, Not doping is optimal for Player 1 if.
W
2
> W − hgF− c′ (2.28)





Therefore if the fine is sufficiently high then it can induce a no-doping equi-
librium.
While the current punishment for those caught doping does often seem quite
lenient, considering that elite level athletes are not completely removed from
the competition pool for the entirety of their career should they fall foul of
WADA rules surrounding doping practises.
However, attempting to modify current rules to deter may athletes in such
a manner may present difficulties. One difficulty may be the credibility of
5This in variance is highly dependent on an assumption of risk neutrality.
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threatening a significant punishment, like removing the athlete from all fu-
ture participation. This penalty may not seem like much of a punishment to
a young athlete with little chance of making it into the top echelons of the
sport and may not act as a deterrent. Imposing a large punishment that acts
as a deterrent is therefore easier said than done.
These problems become even more acute if there is asymmetry in ability or
the possibility that an athlete will test positive even if they did not dope
(Berentsen 2002). To illustrate the point let us reconsider the asymmetric abil-
ity game of table 2.5 and suppose that with probability gF a a test will reveal
a false positive and so say someone doped when they did not. The payoff
matrix for this example is somewhat messy and so we shall focus purely on
the possibility of maintaining a no-doping equilibrium
Consider the incentives for Player 2. Even though they do not dope, Player 2
still has the probability hgF of testing positive. The expected payoff for Payer
2 is
u2 = (1− p)W − hgFF (2.30)
In this case if u2 < 0 then it is better in expected value terms for Player 2 to
simply avoid participating in the game and we would have no contest. In
this case we must assume that u2 > 0 for competition to occur. This imposes





Now consider Player 1. If Player 1 does not dope then their expected payoff
is uBnD = pW − hgFF. If Player 1 does decide to dope then their expected
payoff is uBD = (P + δ1)W − hgF − c′. Allowing for uBD < uBnD gives us
the constraint.
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TABLE 2.9: Prisoners dilemma game with Punishment
P2
No Dope Dope
No Dope W2 ,
W
2 hgW, W(1− hg)− c′
P1






The main issue faced is that it is impossible to satisfy both the participation
constraint and the incentive constraint. This will, for instance, be the case
if gF is close to g which is not an unlikely outcome given the difficulty of
testing for banned substances. This illustration shows that is very difficult
to create a punishment system that is harsh enough to deter deter doping
while not being too harsh to deter athletes taking part at all. Again, this
comes back to basic issues regarding the credibility of harsh punishment.
Punishment of losers, or non-dopers, may simply be impossible or counter-
productive. This naturally leads to alternative formulations in which the fine
and/or probability of detection depend on the performance of the athlete
(Berentsen 2002). This, however, creates a different type of problem.
To illustrate the difficulties with a variable punishment system suppose that
if the winning athlete tests positive (and the 2nd placed athlete does not) then
the winning prize automatically goes to the second placed athlete.
If the second placed athlete tests positive for an illegal substance then there is
no punishment and we then end up with the outcome outlined in table 2.11.
In this case Player 1 dopes and Player 2 does not, then with the probability
hg Player 1 is caught doping and Player 2 is awarded the Prize, W.
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If both decide to dope then the issue becomes slightly more complicated,
there is a 50% chance that Player 1 wins and a probability 1− hg that Player
1 passes the doping test then keeps the prize. There is also a 50% chance that
Player 2 wins and with the probability hg(1− hg) they will test positive for
using an illegal substance whilst Player 1 does not.
Therefore the probability of Player 1 receiving the prize is 12(1− hg)+ 12 hg(1−
h)
Taking away prize money is more credible than an arbitrarily large fine and
should not deter participation. But, how high must the probability of detec-
tion be to sustain a no-doping equilibrium? If Player 2 does not dope then
Player 1 would prefer to also not dope if
W
2









Clearly, the current record on doping tests would suggest that a probability
of detection anywhere near 50 percent is simply not possible for many types
of performance enhancing drugs (particularly if we want to avoid false pos-
itives). If this form of deterrent is to work it is, therefore, essential that other
costs of doping, c′, must be sufficiently high. However, this is not something
that is directly under the control of the doping authorities.
There are many different punishment mechanisms that one can envisage.
The proceeding discussion demonstrates, however, the difficulties in design-
ing a mechanism that works. We either need the fine to be non-credibly high
or the probability of detection to be higher than is realistically possible. So,
while punishment may seem like a simple solution, in reality it is not. We
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would, however, reiterate the message with which we finished the last sec-
tion on the potential benefits of a multi-pronged approach to doping. Social
norms may not be enough, by itself, and punishment may not be enough, by
itself, but maybe the two in combination can be enough.
2.4.1 Punishment in a many Player game
If there are more than two athletes then some additional issues arise, or at
least become more prominent.
We saw above that the possibility of false positive tests could mean an athlete
does best to withdraw from competition. False positives are not, though,
the only reason an athlete might withdraw from competition. To illustrate
consider the following two stage game. In the first stage each of n athletes
independently decide whether or not to take part in the competition. Taking
part incurs a cost in terms of time and effort of K. Let m denote the number of
athletes who take part. In the second stage of the game the m athletes taking
part compete for the prize and have the opportunity to dope. Note that this
second stage is identical to the situation we considered in Section 2.1.2






If m > d? then we can expect d? athletes to dope and for expected payoffs in
this second stage to be zero. if m < d? then every athlete dopes and expected
payoffs are Wm − hgF− c′. It clearly only makes sense for an athlete to partici-
pate in the competition if he expects to recoup the cost K of taking part. This
only happens if less than d? athletes take part. Indeed, we need
W
m
− hgF− c′ > K (2.36)




K + hgF + c′
(2.37)
Therefore if we increase the level of expected punishment, hgF then the level
of d? falls. Upon face value it might seem like there is lower levels of doping,
however the critical factor is m?. As the size of punishment increases the
equilibrium number of athletes that take part will decrease. This indirectly
reduces the number of athletes doping, because every athlete taking part is
predicted to dope. But, it is not really clear that this outcome is ideal. On
the one hand, the fewer the number of athletes who dope then the less the
overall damage to health. Ideally, though, we would also like to increase the
chances of someone winning without doping. And this does not happen.
Instead, athletes are simply driven away from competing.
The preceding example illustrates a more general principle regarding the
possible consequences of sanctions. Namely, that we not only need to think
of the direct and immediate effect that sanctions have on existing athletes but
also the consequences they have for potential future athletes. If punishments
work so well that they eliminate (or significantly reduce) doping then this
will surely have a positive effect on the number of athletes competing. If,
however, sanctions prove largely ineffective then they may well reduce the
number of athletes competing (Hirschmann 2015). This is because a young
athlete not only needs to enter a sporting world where doping is present but
also has to contend with the potential costs of punishment.
The consequences of self-selection into professional sport are potentially very
worrying. In particular, it is those young athletes with the strongest norms
against doping that are likely to go elsewhere, while those with the weakest
norms stay. This may exasperate efforts to reduce doping in sport. We see yet
another reason, therefore, why punishments may not be a simple solution to
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doping.
2.5 Conclusions
There are two key lessons to draw from this chapter. First, the fact that many
athletes dope does not preclude the possibility that all athletes would prefer
a world in which there is no doping. Incentives encourage athletes to dope
even though they would prefer clean sport. It is, therefore, far too simplistic
to simplify vilify athletes for cheating. Instead, we need to recognize the
social dilemma that is taking place and appreciate that doping in sport is an
institutional problem. Clearly that does not mean we should turn a blind eye
to athletes who cheat and lie. It does, though, mean we need to view the
problem at an institutional and social level rather than being overly focused
on individual athletes.
Given that doping is a dead-weight loss there are very strong arguments for
policy intervention to reduce doping. In particular, athletes would choose to
have a system where doping is eradicated, even if that system involves costs.
We do not, therefore, support calls for the complete liberalization of doping
rules. The second key thing we have learned in this chapter, however, is
that there is no simple fix for doping. Social norms and doping sanctions are
unlikely to be enough, on their own, to eradicate doping.
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Chapter 3
Doping as a continuum
3.1 Introduction
The use of performance enhancing drugs has long been the biggest prob-
lem facing sports administrators in relation to cheating (Preston and Szy-
manski 2003). And it is a problem that clearly refuses to go away, despite
the ever more concerted efforts of administrating bodies such as the World
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). Indeed, there seems a never-ending cycle of
scandals, intrigue and accusations, whether it be state sponsored doping by
the Russians, the UK Anti-Doping investigation of Team Sky, or Justin Gatlin
winning 100m World Championship gold despite twice being banned in the
past for doping violations. There are also constant advances in the methods
available to dopers with breakthroughs in biological, bio-molecular and bio-
chemical research. Doping in sport provides, therefore, a fascinating case
study on the difficulties of regulating and controlling cheating in a high-
stakes environment.
The decision to dope is clearly a multi-faceted one that will depend on indi-
vidual characteristics, such as willingness to deceive, and cultural character-
istics, such as the prevailing norms within a sport or training camp (Ntouma-
nis et al. 2014). Strategic incentives are, though, likely to prove especially
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important. In particular, whether it be an elite athlete competing for world
fame (and multi-million pound sponsorship deals) or a lower level athlete
competing for a place on the team (and enough money to ‘pay the bills’) the
financial incentives for illicit behavior are clear. And a crucial thing to recog-
nize is the inter-dependence between athletes; as one athlete decides whether
to dope in order to get ahead of, or keep up with, competitors, those same
competitors are independently also deciding whether to dope.1 We end up,
therefore, with a strategic game (Breivik 1987, Haugen 2004).
This chapter adds to the growing body of work that draws on game theory to
analyze doping in sport. The key novelty in our approach is to model doping
as an all pay auction. Specifically, we consider a two stage game in which
players first choose how much to dope and then choose how much effort to
exert in training. The combination of ability, doping and effort determine a
player’s score. Players with the highest score win prizes (where we allow
that there may be more than one prize). Because doping and effort costs
are sunk and those with the highest scores win we have an all pay auction.
Interestingly, the literature on all pay auctions often uses sport to provide
motivating examples (e.g. Cohen and Sela 2008, Minchuk and Sela 2014,
Franke et al. 2014). The literature on doping in sport has, however, not, to
the best of our knowledge, used an all pay auction approach.
We apply a seminal result on all pay auctions due to Siegel (2009) to deter-
mine equilibrium levels of doping. The crucial advantage of the Siegel (2009)
result is that it allows us to determine expected payoffs without having to
explicitly solve for equilibrium effort levels. This means that we can focus
our attention on doping decisions and consider a very general framework.
We begin our analysis by deriving conditions under which there exists an
1For instance, the highest finish for a rider competing in the grand classification of the
Tour de France, between 1998 and 2006, who has never been implicating in doping was
fourth. Or consider the woman’s 1500m race at the 2012 London Olympics, the ‘dirtiest race
in history’, in which 6 of the top 9 athletes have since been found guilty of doping.
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equilibrium with no doping. As one would expect this critically depends
on the costs to doping. We then look at equilibria with doping. Through a
series of examples we show that, depending on the costs and returns from
doping, anything is possible. For instance, counter-intuitively, the unique
equilibrium may involve a less able player doping while a more able player
‘gives up’. We also demonstrate, however, that the doping profile will take a
particular form in which those ‘close to the margin’ are most likely to dope.
So, informally, the most able and least able athletes are not predicted to dope
but those ‘in the middle’ are.
One contribution of our analysis is to demonstrate the coordination aspect of
strategic doping. To explain, one of our results is that the equilibrium num-
ber of players who dope is at most the number of prizes that can be won. So,
if there are, say, 10 prizes corresponding to 10 places for funding by a national
sports association, then at most 10 athletes will dope. There could, though,
be considerable ambiguity over who the dopers will be. Differences in ability
provide some guide but there are still likely to be multiple equilibria. This
suggests that doping in sport is similar to market entry or congestion games
in which players need to coordinate (e.g. Rapoport, Seale and Winter 2000,
2002, Selten et al. 2007). How athletes can ‘coordinate’ on doping is unclear
but, as we discuss in the conclusion, sequential doping choice in which junior
athletes take as given the doping decisions of older athletes is one possibil-
ity. Another possibility is that factors such as nationality or stage in career
become focal norms for doping. Both these things can give rise to cycles in
doping behavior over time.
There is a large theoretical literature on doping in sport (Dilger, Frick and
Tolsdorf 2007). One strand of the literature focuses exclusively on the dop-
ing decision and, in doing so, abstracts away from the choice of effort (e.g.
Breivik 1987, Bird and Wagner 1997, Berentsen 2002, Haugen 2004, Eber 2008,
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Stowe and Gilpatric 2010 and Haugen, Nepusz and Petróczi 2013). This work
has given crucial insight on how the incentive to dope depends on compet-
itive forces. By construction, though, it can say nothing about the interplay
between doping and effort. Another strand of literature looks at doping and
effort in combination, using contest theory (e.g. Krakel 2007, Gilpatric 2011,
Ryvkin 2013, Mohan and Hazari 2016). Our paper complements this litera-
ture, but must not be seen as a direct replacement due to the simplicity of the
threashold analysis.
The difficulty with the contest theory approach is that fairly specific func-
tional forms (e.g. Krakel 2007, Gilpatric 2011) or strong assumptions such
as homogeneity (Ryvkin 2013) are necessary to obtain results. This makes it
a challenge to obtain a flexible approach that can yield general insight. We
would argue that our approach offers flexibility and tractability, and can eas-
ily be applied to look at a range of policy interventions. Hence, it is a key
contribution to the literature. In making this claim we should acknowledge
that our approach relies on two key assumptions, namely a strict separation
between doping and effort decisions. We shall motivate both assumptions
in due course. But, a general point we would make, is the importance of
having complementary approaches with which to study doping. Our paper
provides a novel approach and, in so doing, moves us closer to this goal.
Before we proceed to the analysis we briefly highlight that, while our model
is framed in terms of doping in sport, the potential applications are more
general (Berentsen and Lengwiler 2004, Berentsen, Bruegger and Loertscher
2008). In particular, the incentive to circumvent rules is prevalent and re-
warding in a wide variety of markets. For instance, within the labour market
cheating could entail the willingness of employee to bribe customers or su-
pervisors to increase their position in a hierarchical management structure
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(Krakel 2007). Or, within education, individuals may collude in order to in-
crease their ability on academic tests (McCabe, Treviño and Butterfield 2001).
Note, however, that, because of the strict separation between cheating and
effort, our model is only applicable to situations, like doping in sport, where
cheating is planned and pre-meditated. So it fits better a case of, say, aca-
demic cheating where a scientist ‘knew all along’ that they would fabricate
data than someone who has some ‘bad luck’ in the lab and impulsively fab-
ricates data.
This chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 3.2 we introduce the model and
notation. In Section 3.3 we solve for equilibrium payoffs in the competition
stage of the game where players choose effort. In Section 3.4 we provide a
range of results on equilibrium behavior in the doping stage. In Section 3.5
we conclude.
3.2 Model and notation
There are n players competing for prizes. Let N = {1, ..., n} denote the set
of players. Each player i ∈ N is endowed with an ability level ai ≥ 0 where
a high ai indicates high ability. We refer to a = {a1, ..., an} as an ability pro-
file. The ability profile a is assumed to be common knowledge and exoge-
nously determined. For simplicity we assume that no two players have the
same ability. Ability will, therefore, be the key source of heterogeneity in our
model.
We consider a game with two stages. In the first stage all players i ∈ N
simultaneously choose how much to dope. Hence we refer to this as the
doping stage. Let di ≥ 0 denote the amount that player i ∈ N dopes. In
interpretation, di = 0 means that player i does not dope and di > 0 means
he does. The higher is di then the higher the level of doping. Player i pays
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doping cost f (di) where we assume that f is a strictly increasing function
with f (0) = 0. Note that we do not impose any restrictions on di other than
those implied by f . For instance, if there is a maximum feasible level of
doping d¯ then we can set f (d) = ∞ for all d ≥ d¯. We refer to d = {d1, ..., dn}
as a doping profile. Crucially, we assume that at the end of the doping stage
the doping profile d is common knowledge. This assumption is discussed in
more detail after we finish explaining the game.
In the second stage of the game all players i ∈ N simultaneously choose an
effort level. We refer to this as the competition stage. Let ei ≥ 0 denote the
effort that player i exerts. In interpretation, ei = 0 can be seen as a baseline
level of effort and ei > 0 more than this baseline. Player i pays effort cost
c(ei|ai, di) where c is an increasing function of ei and a decreasing function of
ai and di. We shall sometimes write ci(ei) where the i subscript recognizes the
role of ai and di. Note that doping works, in our model, by lowering the cost
of effort. Broadly speaking there are two distinct ways that this can manifest
itself. First, doping can lower the cost of achieving an effort level that would
have been feasible without doping. Second, doping can allow an effort level
that is not feasible without doping.2 The scientific evidence would suggest
that both effects are present although the first effect is more relevant for male
competition and the second for female competition (Cooper 2013).
We refer to e = {e1, ..., en} as an effort profile. For some of our results we shall
assume that doping is more effective the less able the player. Specifically,
Assumption 1: For any effort level e > 0, doping level δ > 0 and abilities
ai < aj we assume that c(e|ai, di = 0) − c(e|ai, di = δ) ≥ c(e|aj, di = 0) −
c(e|aj, di = δ) ≥ 0.
2For instance, we might have that c(ei|ai, d) = ∞ for all ei ≥ e(d) for some function e(d)
that is increasing in d. So, doping pushes out the boundaries of achievable effort.
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This assumption would seem broadly consistent with the scientific evidence
(Cooper 2013). In particular, doping appears most effective in allowing a less
able athlete to ‘catch up’ with more able athletes.
For each player i ∈ N the ability ai together with doping di and effort ei de-
termine a score given by si(ei, ai, di). We assume that si(ei, ai, di) is weakly
increasing in all its arguments. Hence, effort, ability and doping combine to
increase a player’s score. Prizes are allocated on the basis of score. Specif-
ically, the m players with the highest score receive prize V and the n − m
remaining players receive prize 0. In interpretation this might be athletes
competing to win the ‘gold medal’ in which case m = 1 or it might be junior
athletes competing for a ‘place on the team’ in which case m > 1. If scores
are tied then we assume that each player in the tie has an equal chance of
winning a prize.
Given ability profile a, doping profile d and effort profile e we can determine
a score profile s = {s1, s2, ..., sn} and determine the expected prize of each
player {v1(s), v2(s), ..., vn(s)}. The final payoff of player i ∈ N is given by
ui(e, a, d) = vi(s)− c(ei|ai, di)− f (di).
Thus, payoffs are the expected prize minus the cost of effort and the cost
of doping. Our framework corresponds to that of an all-pay auction in that
highest scores win and all effort and doping costs are sunk.
Throughout the following we shall draw on a parameterized version of the
model to illustrate key results. In the example we set
c(e|ai, di) = e− ai1+ di
and si(ei, ai, di) = ei. Thus, score is determined by effort with ability and
doping making it cheaper to achieve a particular level of effort. Note that
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this cost function satisfies Assumption 1. Also, we set f (di) = α+ βdi where
α and β are the fixed and variable costs of doping. In this paper we do not
explicitly model the role of punishment and of doping authorities but we
can think of α and β as being partly under the control of the authorities.
For instance, a tougher regime of testing and punishment could be expected
to increase α and β. Given that we have claimed that a key advantage of
our model is its flexibility, let us highlight that the results to follow are not
specific to our parameterized version of the model.
One important thing to clarify about our model is the separation between
doping and effort decisions. Our framework assumes that a player chooses
whether to dope before they choose effort level. The actual doping may come
in hand with effort it is just that the player knows both how much they will
dope when choosing effort level and the level of doping that other competi-
tors have chosen. One way to justify this assumption is to note that doping
typically has long run effects and involves a sustained program of treatment.
While there may be an athlete who ‘pops a pill’ before a major competition,
most doping is far more sophisticated and involved (Huybers and Mazanov
2012). In particular it involves pre-commitment. This would suggest that
doping is a conscious decision a person makes about how to proceed with
their sporting career. Effort in training would then be adapted as appropri-
ate.
Another critical assumption in our model is that doping decisions are com-
mon knowledge. This assumption may seem at direct odds with the inability
of the authorities to enforce doping regulations. It does not seem, however,
unrealistic to assume that athletes have a good idea about whether their fel-
low competitors are doping. The difficulty for the authorities is one of ob-
taining evidence that would stand up in a court of law. Accusations, for in-
stance, about Lance Armstrong were around while he was winning the Tour
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de France, and his competitors seemed well aware he was doping. It just
took time for the evidence to come out. More generally, when an athlete is
caught doping the shock seems to be more that they got caught rather than
that they were doping in the first place. So, while we recognize the assump-
tion of common knowledge is an important one we think it can be justified
as a reasonable approximation in many sports. We discuss this issue further
in the conclusion.
3.3 Competition stage
In this section we focus on the competition stage. So, the ability profile
a = {a1, a2, ..., an} and doping profile d = {d1, d2, ..., dn} are taken as given
and common knowledge. It remains for players to simultaneously choose
effort level. Let ei denote the effort level chosen by player i. This determines
player i’s score si(ei, ai, di). With a slight abuse of notation we shall denote
by c(si|ai, di) = c(ei|ai, di) the cost of reaching score si. Once we have the
score profile s = {s1, ..., sn} we can determine the expected prize vi(s) of any
player i ∈ N. The payoff of player i in the competition stage can be written
pii(s) = vi(s)− c(si|ai, di).
In our parameterized version this is given by
pii(s) = vi(s)− si − ai1+ di .
Note that doping costs can be ignored in the competition stage because they
are made irrevocably in the doping stage.
The competition stage is an all pay auction fitting the framework analyzed by
Siegel (2009). Following the approach of Siegel (2009), player i’s reach is given
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by the highest score for which the cost of achieving that score equals the value
of the prize. So, ri = max{si ≥ 0|V = c(si|ai, di)}. In our parameterized
example we get
ri = V(1+ di) + ai
Our assumptions guarantee that a unique value for ri exists for any values of
ai and di. Define a player as marginal if there are m players with a (weakly)
higher reach and n−m− 1 players with a (weakly) lower reach. The thresh-
old T of the competition stage is the reach of a marginal player. The threshold
denotes the maximum bid of the last possible player to win a prize. Note that
because of ties there may be more than one marginal player. This does not
alter the value of the threshold but is critical, as we discuss shortly, if we wish
to apply the results of Siegel (2009).
The threshold will depend on the ability profile a and doping profile d (but
will not depend on the effort profile) and so we shall sometimes use the no-
tation T(a, d). Given ability profile a and doping profile d we say that effort
profile e is the Nash equilibrium of the competition stage if no player can
strictly gain from changing their effort level given the effort level of others.
The following result follows directly from Theorem 1 of Siegel (2009).
Proposition 1: Consider any ability profile a and doping profile d for which
the marginal player is unique. Then in any Nash equilibrium e of the com-
petition stage the expected payoff of player i is given by pii(s) = max{V −
c(T(a, d)|ai, di), 0}.
To illustrate the application of Proposition 1 consider our parameterized ex-
ample. Let j be the marginal player, implying that T = V(1 + dj) + aj. The
cost for player i of achieving the threshold is then max{(T− ai)/(1+ di), 0}.
If ai ≥ T then the cost of achieving the threshold is 0 and the the expected
equilibrium payoff of player i is V. If ai < T then the expected equilibrium
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payoff of player i is
pii(s) = max
{











Observe that the expected payoff of player i is higher the bigger the gap in
doping and ability between him and the marginal player. This provides the
incentive to dope which will study more in the next section.
In interpretation of Proposition 1 we can think of the m players with high-
est reach as the ‘winning players’ because they have a positive payoff while
the remaining n−m players are the ‘losing players’ because their payoff is 0
(Siegel 2009). Note, however, that the equilibrium may involve mixed strate-
gies and so in any realized outcome the winning players need not win a prize
and the losing players may win a prize. We shall not delve further here into
the effort levels that players choose. The crucial thing from our perspective
is that Proposition 1 allows us to solve for equilibrium payoffs in the compe-
tition stage and thus determine optimal doping decisions.
Before we consider the doping stage let us briefly comment on the require-
ment that the marginal player be unique. This is necessary in order to apply
the power condition of Siegel (2009). Without this condition there exists at
least one Nash equilibrium as detailed in Proposition 1 but it can no longer
be guaranteed that all Nash equilibrium are of this form (see Corollary 2 of
Siegel 2009). In the setting of Siegel (2009) it is innocuous to assume that the
marginal player is unique. It would be analogous, for instance, to saying that
no two players have the same ability. Given, however, that in our setting
players choose how much to dope we cannot automatically rule out the pos-
sibility that players would choose to have the same reach. This is something,
therefore, that we need to verify when looking at the doping stage.
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3.3.1 Parameterized model
In order to show the flexibility of our model, we briefly work through the
parameterized models considered by Krakel (2007) and Gilpatric (2011).
Let us begin with Krakel (2007). In this case we can think of the the score
of player i, for doping di, ability ai and effort level ei, as given by si =
(1 + di)aiei. Note that Krakel (2007) considers a binary doping decision but
we will not make that restriction here. The cost of effort is then given by
c(e|ai, di) = ke2/2 for some parameter k. In this example we can see that the
cost of effort does not depend on ability or doping. Instead doping works
by increasing score for a given level of effort and ability. This means that
assumption 1 is trivially satisfied.
Consider the competition stage. The key thing we need to do is determine
the cost of reaching score si for player i. Taking ai and di as given we need
ei = si/(1+ di)ai. Hence the cost of score si is






The reach of player i is then given by





As in our parameterized example, reach is increasing in ability and doping.
If player j is the marginal player we have threshold T = (1 + dj)aj
√
2V/k.
The cost for player i of achieving the threshold is then
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As one would expect, the payoff of player i is increasing in own ability and
doping. Interestingly, k drops out of the picture, primarily because it only
serves to scale the amount of effort players would exert in equilibrium.
Once we know equilibrium payoffs in the competition stage we can proceed
to analyze the doping stage as for our parameterized example. To very briefly
illustrate, consider the incentive for athlete 1 to dope if other athletes do not
dope. Moreover, suppose that athlete 1 would be a winning player even if he
did not dope. Then player 1’s payoff if he does not dope is u(d1 = 0, d−1) =
V(1− (a0/a1)2) where a0 is the ability of the marginal player. If he dopes his





















3 − 1. (3.1)
If player 1 chooses d?1 then his payoff would be










From this we can determine whether or not player 1 has an incentive to dope.
For instance, if β = 0 then the optimal level of doping is arbitrarily large
meaning that, if he chooses to dope, player 1 receives payoff V − α. Thus,
doping is only deterred if α > V(a0/a1)2. The higher the ability gap the less
Chapter 3. Doping as a continuum 61
deterrence is required.
We turn now to the approach of Gilpatric (2011). Here we can think of the
score of player i, with doping di, ability ai and effort level ei, as given by si =
ai + ei + di. A generic cost function is assumed by Gilpatric (2011) and so let
us retain cost function c(e|ai, di) = ke2/2. Again, this means that Assumption
1 is satisfied.
Consider the cost of reaching score si for player i. Taking ai and di as given
we need ei = max{si − ai − di, 0}. Hence the cost of score si is
c(si|ai, di) = k(si − ai − di)
2
2





+ ai + di.
If player j is the marginal player we have threshold T =
√
2V/k + aj + dj.
The cost for player i of achieving the threshold is then




+ aj − ai + dj − di
)2
if T > ai + di. Otherwise it is 0. This means, applying Proposition 1, that the










if T > ai + di. Otherwise we have pii(s) = V. Again, the payoff of player i is
increasing in the ability gap and doping gap between him and the marginal
player.
The preceding analysis demonstrates that it is a relatively simple matter to
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determine payoffs in the competition stage, pii(s), for any specific example
of a score and cost function. Once we know pii(s) the analysis can proceed
to the doping stage. The ease of this will depend to a large extent on how
‘simple’ the equations come out and so a result as neat as Proposition 2 may
not be possible. Recall, however, that the analysis and results of Section 3.2
is not specific to our parameterized example. Characterizing reach and the
threshold is, therefore, enough of itself to gain key insight on doping incen-
tives.
3.4 Doping stage
As this is a dynamic game, In this section we will focus on the doping stage
in order to determine a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We do so with
the assumption that payoffs in the competition stage will be as set out in
Proposition 1. Thus, for any doping profile {d1, ..., dn} we can associate a
profile of expected competition payoffs {pi1(d), ...,pin(d)}. This allows us to
treat the doping stage as a game in which each player i chooses how much to
dope knowing that his final payoff will be pii(d)− f (di)where d is the doping
profile. We say that doping profile d is a Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of
the doping stage if no player wants to change their doping decision given the
decisions of others.
3.4.1 No doping equilibrium
We begin our analysis of the doping stage by exploring the conditions under
which there exists a no doping equilibrium, i.e. a Nash equilibrium of the
doping stage where d1 = ... = dn = 0. Without loss of generality we shall
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focus on player 1. So, of interest is to explore the incentives for player 1 to
dope if d2 = d3 = ... = dn = 0.
If player 1 does not dope then the threshold in the competition stage will
be entirely determined by relative abilities. Specifically a player is marginal
if there are m players with a (weekly) higher ability and n − m − 1 players
with a lower ability. Thus, the m winning players will be the m players with
highest ability and the n−m losing players will be those with lowest ability.
Note that in order for the marginal player to be unique it would be enough
that no two players have the same ability. Let T0 denote the reach of the
marginal player. There are two cases for us to consider: (a) player 1 is in the
set of m players with highest ability or (b) he is not. We consider each in turn.
If player 1 is in the set of m players with highest ability then he would be in
the set of winning players if he chose not to dope. Applying Proposition 1,
his expected payoff would be u(d1 = 0, d−1) = V − c(T0|a1, d1 = 0) > 0. The
potential advantage of doping is that it would lower the cost of achieving a
high score. If he dopes d?1 > 0 then his expected payoff would be u(d
?
1 , d−1) =
V − c(T0|a1, d?1)− f (d?1). It is, therefore, in his interest to dope if and only if
there exists some d?1 > 0 such that
c(T0|a1, d1 = 0)− c(T0|a1, d?1) > f (d?1). (3.2)
In other words, the reduced cost of effort must compensate for the cost of
doping.
To put this in context we can work through our parameterized example. In
this case T0 = V + a0 where a0 is the ability of the marginal player. If player
1 does not dope his expected payoff is simply u(d1 = 0, d−1) = min{a1 −
a0, V}. Let ∆0 = a1 − a0. If ∆0 ≥ V then player 1 cannot possibly gain from
doping because the gap in ability is already enough that his payoff will be V.
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So, consider ∆0 < V. In this case, if he dopes d1 > 0 then his expected payoff













Clearly this is only a feasible solution if V−∆0 > β. If V−∆0 > β and player
1 chooses d?1 then his payoff would be
u1(d?1 , d−1) = V − 2
√
β(V − ∆0)− α+ β.
Recall that u(d1 = 0, d−1) = ∆0. It is, therefore, optimal for player 1 to not
dope if and only if
V − ∆0 − 2
√
β(V − ∆0)− α+ β ≤ 0. (3.4)
For instance, if β = 0 we require V − ∆0 < α.
We shall revisit the example shortly. The key thing to highlight at this point
is how the preceding discussion demonstrates that it can be in an athletes
interest to dope even if he would be a winning player without doping. The
intuition for this is that doping makes it easier for him to achieve the level
that he would have been able to achieve with costly effort. Put another way,
doping reduces the cost of the effort he needs to exert to be a winning player.
We now turn to the losing players. If player 1 is in the set of n − m play-
ers with lowest ability then his expected payoff if he does not dope is u(d1 =
0, d−1) = 0. The potential advantage of doping is that it can elevate him to the
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set of winning players. If player 1 joins the set of winning players then the
marginal player necessarily changes. Specifically, the player with the m’th
highest ability would now become marginal, and no longer be a winning
player. Note, that it is not in player 1’s interest to ‘match’ the marginal player
because then his expected prize would still be 0 but he would have the cost
of doping. It is only in player 1’s interest to dope, therefore, if he puts him-
self ahead of the marginal player. This is enough to rule out any tie for the
marginal player (if ability is heterogeneous). Let T00 > T0 denote the reach
of the new marginal player.
If he dopes d?1 > 0 then player 1’s expected payoff would be u(d
?
1 , d−1) =
V − c(T00|a1, d?1)− f (d?1). It is, therefore, in his interest to dope if and only if
there exists some d?1 > 0 such that
V > c(T00|a1, d?1) + f (d?1). (3.5)
In other words, the prize from becoming a winning player must be sufficient
to compensate for the cost of effort and the cost of doping. Let us high-
light how the trade-offs for a losing player are different to those of a winning
player in that doping increases the equilibrium cost of effort for the losing
player while it decreases it for a winning player. This is because a losing
player who dopes increases effort in order to secure the gain from doping.
In the parameterized example we have T00 = V + a00 where a00 is the ability
of the new marginal player. The first thing to consider is how much player 1
needs to dope in order to become a winning player. The reach of player 1 is
V(1+ d1) + a1 while the reach of the marginal player is V + a00. So, player 1
becomes a winning player if and only if
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For d1 > d¯ we have u1(d1, d−1) = (Vd1 + a1 − a00)/(1 + d1)− α− βd1. Let













Setting d??1 > d¯ gives condition β < V/
√
V + ∆00. Suppose that β is suffi-
ciently small and player 1 chooses d??1 then his payoff would be
u1(d??1 , d−1) = V − 2
√
β(V + ∆00)− α+ β.
Recall that u(d1 = 0, d−1) = 0. It is, therefore, optimal for player 1 to not
dope if and only if
V − 2
√
β(V + ∆00)− α+ β ≤ 0. (3.7)
For instance, if β = 0 we require V < α.
We have just seen that a losing player may have an incentive to dope in order
to become a winning player. We previously saw that a winning player may
have an incentive to dope in order to lower the costs of effort. Only if the
costs of doping are sufficiently high will, therefore, we obtain a non-doping
equilibrium. To bring the analysis together our next proposition provides a
simple sufficient (not necessary) condition for the existence of a no-doping
equilibrium in our parameterized example.
Proposition 2: There exists a no-doping subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of the doping stage, in the parameterized example, if
√
V ≤√α+√β.
Chapter 3. Doping as a continuum 67
Proof: Consider first a winning player. We adopt the notation used above. A
limiting case is a1 ≈ a0 meaning that ∆0 ≈ 0. It is clear that a player in this
position would have most incentive to dope. (See Proposition 4, to follow,
for a formal proof of this.) Applying equation (3.4) we know that he would
not dope if V − 2√βV − α− β ≤ 0. This can be rewritten (√V −√β)2 ≤ α.
We know this holds given that
√
V ≤√α+√β. Consider next a losing player.
Again, the limiting case is a1 ≈ a00 meaning that ∆00 ≈ 0. It is clear that a
player in this position would have most incentive to dope. (See Proposition
5 for a formal proof of this.) Applying equation (3.7) we know that he would
not dope if V − 2√βV − α− β ≤ 0. The argument then follows through as
for a winning player. QED
Whilst Proposition 1 is specific to our parameterized example, it illustrates
how equations (3.2) and (3.5) can be applied to yield insight. In particular,
Proposition 2 gives an easily interpretable condition on the required costs of
doping necessary to make no-doping an equilibrium. One interesting ele-
ment of Proposition 2 is that the number of players, n, and number of prizes,
m, drop out of the story. Technically speaking this is because we provide suf-
ficient and not necessary conditions. There is, though, a more general lesson
that can be discerned in this regard, as we now discuss.
The crucial thing that determines incentives is the relative advantage (or dis-
advantage) a player has compared to the marginal player. This means that
the gap between the m’th most able player and the m + 1’st most able player
is all important. If that marginal ability gap is large then there is little incen-
tive to dope. If that gap is small then there is more incentive to dope. The
values of n and m only matter through the effect they have on the marginal
ability gap. Intuitively, one would expect that an increase in the number of
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players lowers the marginal ability gap.3 Similarly, if high ability is more
exceptional then an increase in m could be expected to lower the marginal
ability gap. In Proposition 2 we assume the gap is zero and so provide an
upper bound on how large the costs of doping must be to deter doping.
3.4.2 Doping equilibrium
In this sub-section we look at conditions under which there will be players
who dope. We have already discussed the incentives to dope if others do
not dope. Here we focus more on the incentives to dope if others dope. The
following result is trivial but important in interpretation.
Proposition 3: If doping profile d = {d1, ..., dn} is a Nash equilibrium of the
doping stage and di > 0 then pii(d) > 0.
Proof: Suppose, to the contrary, that di > 0 and pii(d) = 0. The overall payoff
of player i is ui(d) = − f (di). Recall that f is a strictly increasing function
with f (0) = 0. So ui(d) < 0. If player i were to not dope then his payoff
would be ui(di = 0, d−i) ≥ 0. QED
Proposition 3 implies that if, in equilibrium, a player dopes then he must be
a winning player. Crucially, this implies that at most m players will dope. It
is interesting to reflect that this finding differs from the standard prisoners
dilemma type argument that all players will dope (e.g. Berentsen 2002; Hau-
gen 2004). The primary difference is the possibility of ties. In our setting,
no two players will have the same score and there is nothing to be gained
from having the m + 1 highest score. In other settings ties are possible (Hau-
gen 2004) or score has a random component (e.g. Gilpatric 2011). Both these
3It need not. To illustrate suppose that initially there are 5 players with high ability and
5 players with low ability and m = 6. Then the marginal ability gap is small. Now add
another higher ability player, keeping m = 6. Then the marginal ability gap has increased.
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things can mean that mean that more than m players dope in equilibrium.
The more interesting question in our model will be whether less than m play-
ers dope meaning that some winning players do not dope.
Propositions 2 and 3 leave open the possibility that anything between 0 and m
players could dope. To illustrate the distinct ways in which doping can arise
in equilibrium it is useful to contrast possible outcomes in the parameterized
example, where we focus on the simplest case of m = 1 and n = 2, meaning
that there are two players competing for one prize. Suppose that a1 > a2 and
so player 1 is the more able player. To simplify the exposition we shall pay
particular attention to the situation in which player 1 chooses between d1 = 0





d?2 are given by equations (3.3) and (3.6)).
Consider, first parameters V = 1, β = 0.01, a1 − a2 = 0.5 and α = 0.1. Table
1 details the payoffs for six possible outcomes. We want to argue that there
exists no (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the doping stage. To make the case,
note that if player 1 does not dope then player 2 has an incentive to dope
in order to become the winning player. The logic for this was discussed in
the previous section. More relevant here is to look at the optimal response of
player 1 if player 2 chooses d?2 = 11.25. It turns out that the optimal response
would be for player 1 to dope himself and choose d1 = 33.1. If player 1
dopes as much as this then the optimal strategy for player 2 is to not dope
at all. But, if player 2 does not dope then it is optimal for player 1 to choose
d?1 . And, if player 1 chooses d
?
1 then it is optimal for player 2 to dope. Table
1, together with Proposition 3, is enough to tell us that there exists no pure
strategy equilibrium in this game.
The primary reason that there exists no equilibrium in the preceding example
is that the cost of doping is relatively small. Keeping everything else the same
suppose that we increase α to 0.2 and β to 0.05. Table 2 details the payoffs in
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TABLE 3.1: Payoffs in the doping stage when V = 1, β =
0.01,∆0 = 0.5 and α = 0.1.
Player 2
0 d?2 = 11.25
Player 1 0 0.5, 0 0, 0.67
d?1 = 6.07 0.77, 0 -0.16, 0.17
33.1 0.55, 0 0.22, -0.21
TABLE 3.2: Payoffs in the doping stage when V = 1, β =
0.05,∆0 = 0.5 and α = 0.1.
Player 2
0 d?2 = 4 7.56
Player 1 0 0.5, 0 0, 0.30 0, 0.25
d?1 = 1.89 0.53, 0 -0.31, -0.09 -0.31, -0.01
8.98 0.30, 0 -0.15, -0.42 -0.46, -0.58
this case. Here we can see that there are two Nash equilibria of the doping
stage. In particular, if player 2 dopes d?2 = 4 then the optimal strategy of
player 1 is to not dope.4 This means we have an equilibrium where player
2 dopes and becomes the winning player. If player 2 does not dope then it
is optimal for player 1 to dope. And if player 1 dopes d?1 = 1.89 then it is
optimal for player 2 to not dope.5 So, we have an equilibrium where player
1 dopes and reduces the cost of effort.
The game we obtain in Table 2 is a form of the ’chicken’ game. There is
an equilibrium where player 1 dopes and reduces the cost of effort and there is
an equilibrium where player 2 dopes in order to become a winning player. Clearly,
equilibrium in this case requires an element of coordination because one, and
only one, player should dope.
To complete the picture we provide two further examples. In our next ex-
ample there exists a unique equilibrium where the more able player dopes. We set
α = 0 meaning that there is no fixed cost of doping but β = 0.45 meaning a
relatively high marginal cost. The low fixed cost incentivizes the more able
4The optimal strategy of player 1 if we set d1 > 0 is to choose d1 = 8.98. As you can see
in Table 2 this does not yield a positive payoff and so it is optimal to set d1 = 0.
5In this case the optimal doping level if we set d2 > 0 would be d2 = 7.56.
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TABLE 3.3: Payoffs in the doping stage when V = 1, β =
0.45,∆0 = 0.5 and α = 0.
Player 2
0 d?2 = 0.83 0.86
Player 1 0 0.5, 0 0, -0.19 0, -0.19
d?1 = 0.05 0.501, 0 -0.02, -0.22 -0.02, -0.22
0.72 0.39, 0 -0.09, -0.37 -0.11, -0.39
TABLE 3.4: Payoffs in the doping stage when V = 1, β =
0.01,∆0 = 0.5 and α = 0.4.
Player 2
0 d?2 = 11.2 26.5
Player 1 0 0.5, 0 0, 0.37 0, 0.28
d?1 = 6.07 0.47, 0 -0.46, -0.13 -0.46, 0.06
33.3 0.25, 0 -0.08, -0.51 -0.52, -0.67
player to dope in order to reduce the cost of effort. The high marginal cost
means that the less able player cannot gain from doping because it is simply
too expensive to dope enough to overcome the ability gap. The payoffs are
given in Table 3.3.
In the next example there exists a unique equilibrium where the less able player
dopes. We set α = 0.4 meaning that there is a high fixed cost of doping but β =
0.01 meaning a relatively low marginal cost. The high fixed cost deters the
more able player from doping. The low marginal cost means that the less able
player can gain from doping. In particular, the payoff gain from becoming a
winning player is enough to offset the high fixed cost of doping. The payoffs
are given in Table 3.4. That we obtain a unique equilibrium in which the more
able player is the losing player may seem perverse. The intuition, however,
is relatively straightforward. Essentially, the more able player can tell the less
able player has an incentive to dope. And if the less able player dopes then
the more able player has nothing to gain from a doping arms race.
Before we move on from the two player case let us highlight that in all the
preceding examples the values of V and δ0 were left unchanged. Changing
the values of α and β was enough, therefore, to generate a wide range of
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equilibrium outcomes. This has crucial implications if we think of policy as
partly determining α and β. In particular, it shows that policy is not just about
deterring doping but also about influencing the forms that doping may take.
For instance, the political and legal realities may make it impossible to simply
increase α and β to the point where nobody wants to dope. Instead, the
authorities may have to trade-off changes in the fixed cost, α, with marginal
cost, β. Our last example illustrates that, if we consider it undesirable that
the less able player dopes to get ahead, we need to raise the marginal cost of
doping, rather than focus on the fixed cost of doping. We will return to this
point in the conclusion.
We have now looked at four specific examples and seen that anything is pos-
sible. We can have a unique equilibrium where the more able player dopes,
no equilibrium, etc. An ‘anything goes’ result in the simplest two player set-
ting of our parameterized example may suggest it is difficult to say much in
the general case. Note, however, that in the two player case, the losing player
is, by definition, the marginal player and the winning player is ‘just’ above
the margin. We are automatically, therefore, focusing in on the the most cru-
cial interaction. This allows us to move relatively easily to the many player
setting.
3.4.3 Threshold analysis
To illustrate, consider a very trivial example. We set n = 4 and m = 2 and
so there are four players competing for two prizes. For instance, it might
be athletes competing for a place on the Olympic squad. Suppose that a1 =
100, a2 = 50.5, a3 = 50 and a4 = 0. Recall that in the parameterized example
the reach of player i is given by ri = V(1 + di) + ai. It is also worth noting
that in the four games we have just looked at we never had reason to consider
di > 40. This all means that player 1 is so far ahead in terms of ability that
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he will be a winning player and has no reason to dope. Even if other players
decided to use maximized doping strategies to reduce their cost of effort and
increase their score, they would not be able to outbid player 1 in the auction
stage.
Similarly, player 4 is so far behind in terms of ability that he will be a losing
player who has no reason to dope. The interest, in terms of doping, comes,
therefore, between players 2 and 3, where a2 − a3 = 0.5. This is where the
real competition for squad places is going to be won and lost and the two
player case is enough to give insight on this competition.
Our next two results apply to the many player general case and show that
players closest to the margin in terms of ability are ‘most likely’ to dope.
There are two sides to this. First, consider two players i and j where ai > aj >
a0 and a0 is the ability of the marginal player. Here the focus is on relatively
able players. We show that if there is an equilibrium in which player i dopes,
then so does player j. Hence, players who are above the marginal player in
terms of ability, but may be superseded by the marginal player should they
decide to enact doping, have the ‘most’ incentives to dope.
Proposition 4: Suppose that players are ordered in terms of ability so that
a1 > a2 > ... > an. Also, suppose that doping profile d? is a Nash equilibrium
of the doping stage and player l is the marginal player. If Assumption 1 holds
and d?i > 0 for some player i < l then d
?
j > 0 for any player i < j < l.
Proof: Take as given a Nash equilibrium of the doping stage d? = {d?1 , ..., d?n}
with marginal player l. Suppose d?i > 0 for some i ∈ N where i < l. Pick
any player i < j < l. If no such player exists or d?j > 0 then we are done.
So, suppose d?j = 0. Proposition 3 implies that d
?
l = 0. This, given that
aj < al, means that player l is a winning player whatever the level of dj.
This, in turn, means the threshold T(a, d?) is independent of dj. Applying
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Proposition 1 we then have that pik(d?) for all k 6= j is also independent of
dj. We can, therefore, change dj without in any way effecting the payoffs or
incentives of any player other than j.
Player j’s expected payoff is u(d?j = 0, d
?
−j) = V − c(T|aj, dj = 0) where
T is the threshold. Player j may gain from doping if it reduces the cost of
effort. Suppose that we set dj = d?i . Then his expected payoff would be
u(d?i , d
?
−j) = V− c(T|aj, dj = d?i )− f (d?i ). Given that player i chooses to dope
we know that c(T|ai, di = 0)− c(T|ai, di = d?i ) > f (d?1). Because, aj < ai we
have, by Assumption 1, that c(T|aj, dj = 0)− c(T|aj, dj = d?i ) > f (d?1). This
means that it cannot be optimal for player j to set dj = 0. QED
For our next result consider two players i and j where ai < aj < a0. Here
the focus is on relatively less able players. We show that if there is a Nash
equilibrium of the doping stage where player i dopes then there must exist
an equilibrium (not necessarily the same one) where player j dopes. Hence,
players just below the marginal player in terms of ability have ‘most’ incen-
tive to dope.
Proposition 5: Suppose that players are ordered in terms of ability so that
a1 > a2 > ... > an. Also suppose that doping profile d? is a Nash equilib-
rium of the doping stage and player l is the marginal player. If d?i > 0 for
some player i > l then for any player j such that i > j > l there exists an
equilibrium d1 where d1j > 0.
Proof: Take as given a Nash equilibrium of the doping stage d? = {d?1 , ..., d?n}
with marginal player l. Suppose d?i > 0 for some i > l. Pick any player
i > j > l. If no such player exists or d?j > 0 then we are done. So, suppose
d?j = 0. Consider the doping profile d




k for all k 6= i, j
and d1j is set to maximize payoff (given d
1
−j). Note that we have essentially
switched players i and j.
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Assume, for now, that player l is the marginal player given doping profile
d1. Then T(a, d?) = T(a, d1) and so, applying Proposition 1, the incentives
of all players k 6= i, j are the same given doping profile d1 as d?. It remains,
therefore, to check the incentives of players i and j and check that player l
does indeed remain the marginal player.
Consider player j. If player j does not dope then his payoff will be 0. So, it is
optimal for player j to dope if there exists d1j > 0 such that V > c(T(a, d
?)|aj, d1j )+
f (d1j ). Given that d
? is a Nash equilibrium we know that V > c(T(a, d?)|ai, d?i )+
f (d?i ). Moreover, aj > ai. So, given that c is a decreasing function of ability,
implies that c(T(a, d?)|ai, d?i ) > c(T(a, d?)|aj, d?i ). This proves that it is opti-
mal for player j to dope.
Consider next player i and strategy profile d1. If player i does not dope then
his payoff will be 0. If he did dope in order to become a winning player then
the marginal player would necessarily change. Let T1 denote the revised
threshold. In order for d1 to be a Nash equilibrium, it must be that there
exists no di > 0 such that V > c(T1|ai, di) + f (di). Given that d? is a Nash
equilibrium we know that there exists no dj > 0 such that V > c(T1|aj, dj) +
f (dj). Also, c(T1|ai, di) > c(T1|aj, di) for all di > 0. This proves that it is
optimal for player i to not dope. Moreover, we can see that player l remains
the marginal player. QED
Note the slight asymmetry between Propositions 4 and 5. With Proposition
4 we find that every player within a certain ability range above that of the
marginal player is predicted to dope. The intuition behind this result is that
doping reduces the cost of being a winning player, for someone who was
destined to be a winning player anyway. Assumption 1 means that those
of lowest ability gain most from doping and so those just above the margin
have most incentive to dope. With Proposition 5 we find that some players
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FIGURE 3.1: Schematic of a possible Nash equilibrium out-
come.
within a certain ability range below that of the marginal player are predicted
to dope. Here we obtain a market entry, ’chicken’ type environment in which
players need to coordinate on who dopes. The intuition here is that players
who dope are going to be winning players but there can only be so many
winning players meaning that an element of coordination is required.
A highly stylized schematic of the kind of outcome we might obtain is de-
picted in Figure 3.1. Here we see that the most able and least able players
do not dope. We then obtain a region ‘in the middle’ with a mix of dopers
and non-dopers. Clearly, given Proposition 3, we know that the number of
prizes is crucial. In particular, the kind of outcome we depict in Figure 3.1 is
dependent on there being a lot of prizes on offer. Again, however, we would
reiterate the different levels at which doping can take place. Winning gold is
obviously a strong incentive but many athletes who dope are on the margins
of being a professional or making it to the Olympics. It is at this level that the
outcome depicted in figure 3.1 is most apt. It clearly shows that incentives to
dope can interact in non-trivial ways with ability and success.
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3.5 Concluding discussion
In this paper we have proposed a new model to analyze doping in sport. The
model consists of two stages in which athletes choose their level of doping
and then level of effort. Payoffs are subsequently determined through an all
pay auction where ‘score’ depends on ability, doping and effort. By using
a seminal result due to Siegel (2009) we are able to obtain general insight on
the incentives to dope. Indeed a key contribution of our paper is to propose a
model that can be applied widely and is not restricted to particular functional
forms.
A fundamental assumption of the model is a separation between doping and
effort. Technically speaking, we assume that doping decisions are common
knowledge before athletes choose effort. At first sight this may seem a strong
assumption, although it could be justified by the notion that athletes have
a good idea what other athletes ‘are up to’. Note, however, that we focus,
as is standard, on pure strategy Nash equilibria and any such equilibrium
implies that players correctly predict what others will do (Ryvkin 2013). This
means that our results are not dependent, per se, on the assumption that
doping is common knowledge. But it is critical that doping decisions are
fixed before effort decisions.6 This assumption seems mild given that doping
in professional sport is not done on a whim.7 Doping, particularly given
the efforts of the authorities to catch drug cheats, is a systematic and highly
involved process.
6To explain the point, suppose that all doping and effort decisions are made and we con-
sider whether an athlete could gain from deviating in his choices. Our results are dependent
upon the fact that if the athlete were to deviate in his doping decision then others may devi-
ate from their current effort decisions. In this regard our model differs from that of Ryvkin
(2007), where doping and effort decisions are, from a strategic point of view, made simulta-
neously.
7The exception here could be recreational drugs that are banned but not taken for their
performance enhancing effects.
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To say that doping is fixed before effort choices are made is not to say that an
athlete cannot change his behavior during his career. It is merely to say that
in building up to specific events or goals effort choices are made after doping
choices have been decided (even if the doping may overlap with training).
As an athlete goes through their career we would expect that ability, together
with the costs and benefits of doping and effort may change. This could
change doping behavior (Petróczi and Aidman 2008). For instance, an ath-
lete who was used to winning without doping may be more inclined to dope
as his ability level falls with age. And our analysis suggests, as we shortly
explain, that things like age may play a critical role in shaping doping cul-
ture.
A key insight of our analysis has been the coordination problem in doping.
More specifically, our analysis suggests that only a limited number of athletes
will dope in equilibrium and it may be ambiguous who dopes. It is worth
noting that this result contrasts with the relatively standard finding in the
literature that all or many athletes will dope, particularly in the absence of
large costs to doping (Breivik 1987, Haugen 2004). The key thing driving our
results is the deterministic nature of our model whereby the athlete with the
highest score gets the highest payoff. Equilibrium doping is higher when out-
comes are probabilistic, either because multiple athletes can end up with the
same score (e.g. Haugen 2004) or outcomes are subject to noise (e.g. Krakel
2007). Clearly sport is subject to random shocks as athletes get injured or
under-perform etc. Even so, one is reminded of the well known quote (often
associated with golfer Gary Player) that ‘the harder you practice, the luckier
you get’. We should not overestimate the role of luck in sport. Moreover,
luck often involves an able athlete not being able to compete, which could
be captured in an extension to our model, rather than fluctuations in score
(see Ryvkin 2013 for similar approach). If outcomes are deterministic then
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the incentive to dope for ‘non-marginal’ athletes (both those good enough to
win easily and those who are unlikely to win) decreases. Equilibrium doping
may not, therefore, be as high as we might expect.
An interesting issue is how athletes could ‘coordinate’ on who dopes. Clearly,
this is unlikely to happen through explicit collusion. More likely are that cer-
tain observable factors serve to signal doping, whether that be age, national-
ity etc. For instance, we might obtain doping cycles in which one generation
dopes and the next does not. This could be consistent with equilibrium in the
sense that there is no point in the young athletes doping if the older ones do.
Then as the young athletes become senior in their sport ‘opportunities’ open
up for the next generation to dope. All kinds of subtle indicators of dop-
ing may emerge. And this offers a connection between the individualistic
approach of game theory and the role of cultural influences emphasized by
others (e.g. Ohl et al. 2015). At its most basic level doping is an individual de-
cision, including the possibility for coaches, parents etc. to advocate doping.
Cultural influences and norms may though influence how those individual
incentives play out.
Let us finish by briefly commenting on policy implications. Our objective
in this paper was to set up and analyze a model of doping in order to gain
insight on the structure of equilibrium doping. In doing this we have ab-
stracted away from policy considerations. The costs of doping can, though,
capture policy to some extent, particularly if we think of interventions as pri-
marily coming ex-post (after the winners are determined) rather than ex-ante
(before the competition). Similar to Berentsen (2002) we found that some-
what perverse outcomes are possible in which doping results in the less able
athlete benefiting. This highlights that policy is not just about deterrence of
itself but also about the kind of outcome we want. Do we want the most able
athletes to win?
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Our model suggests that the distinction between fixed and marginal costs of
doping is crucial. Current anti-doping policy would seem to focus more on
fixed than marginal costs. High fixed costs come from the fact that any viola-
tion of policy, no matter how minor, results in a career threatening ban. Low
marginal costs come from the fact that severe violations do not result in sub-
stantially higher punishments, particularly if the offender ‘cooperates’ with
the authorities. Our results would suggest that this approach is fundamen-
tally flawed. High fixed costs to doping deter the more able athletes from
doping but low marginal costs incentivize less able athletes to dope. We are
likely, therefore, to end up in the worst of worlds where doping takes place
and the less able athletes benefit most. We would suggest moving to a system
with lower fixed costs and higher marginal costs.
Imposing high marginal costs may well be difficult in practice because it cre-
ates the legal minefield of trying to define more severe doping violations. Ef-
forts, though, could still be made in this regard. And even if imposing high
marginal costs is not possible there may still be valid arguments for lowering
marginal costs. In particular, lower marginal costs mean that the more able
athletes have stronger incentives to dope and this, of itself, may deter overall
doping given the effect it has on less able athletes. This is not to suggest that
a laissez-faire approach is best because we would strongly advocate against
this. It is more to highlight the importance of thinking through the impli-
cations that policy has for incentives across the ability spectrum. The best
intentions could easily create perverse incentives to dope.
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Chapter 4
Prize distributions and the
incentive to cheat
4.1 Introduction
Monitoring output in contests or competitive environments is often imper-
fect. For instance, a worker can exaggerate their contribution and achieve-
ments in order to win promotion or secure a new job. Similarly, a firm can
manipulate financial results or exaggerate sales in order to secure a lucrative
deal with a new client. Lying in such contexts can lead to significant inef-
ficiency, both in terms of a mis-allocation of resource (the job going to the
wrong worker) and the crowding out of genuine effort. Relatively little is
known, however, about the willingness of individual’s to lie in contests. In
this paper we compare theoretically and experimentally cheating in a contest
where winner-take-all to a contest with a linear prize structure.
If individuals can lie at little cost then a selfish individual should lie with im-
punity. An extensive experimental literature shows, however, that most peo-
ple are lie-averse (see Rosenbaum, Billinger and Stieglitz 2014 and Capraro
2018 and references therein). A key question we want to address in our work
is how an individuals willingness to lie is influenced by strategic incentives.
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To appreciate the issues consider first a setting with perfect monitoring. In
our theoretical model we find that equilibrium effort is higher with a winner-
take-all prize structure than a linear prize structure. This is consistent with
prior theoretical results (e.g. Moldovanu and Sela 2001, Sisak 2009). Exper-
imental studies also show that winner-take-all generates high effort, when
predicted to do so (e.g. Sheremeta 2011, Dechenaux et al. 2015).
What happens if we have imperfect monitoring with little direct cost of ly-
ing? Selfish individuals would lie with impunity and so a baseline prediction
would be that any gap in output between the winner-take-all and linear prize
structure disappears. The evidence for lie-aversion suggests, however, an al-
ternative possibility. While lying has no direct material cost it does have an
indirect psychological cost. Instead, therefore, of outcomes being determined
by effort, and heterogeneity in ability, they may become determined by lying
and willingness to lie (Gneezy, Rockenbach and Serra-Garcia 2013). If so, we
will still see greater output with the winner-take-all prize structure but this is
now capturing lying, which is arguably a bad thing, rather than effort, which
is a good thing.
Our experiment employs a 2x2 between subject design in which we vary
the prize structure and monitoring of output. Subjects are randomly split
into groups of 6 and given 10 minutes to solve as many mazes as they can.
Prizes are determined by the number of mazes completed. In a winner-take-
all treatment the winner receives a prize of £20 and everyone else £5. In a
linear prize treatment the prizes go from £10 for the first ranked down to
£5 for the 6th ranked. Note that the total prize fund is the same in both
settings. In a monitoring treatment the instructions contain wording which
suggest the mazes will be checked before determining the rank. In an imper-
fect monitoring treatment the instructions make clear that the mazes will not
be checked.
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Comparison across the 4 treatments allows us to explore how output (the
number of mazes completed) varies with the prize structure and monitoring
prime.
Our main hypothesis suggests that output will be higher in the winner-take-
all prize structure irrespective of whether subjects are primed about monitor-
ing of output.However, We only find qualified support for this hypothesis.
Specifically, subjects that performed the task twice with feedback.
The first time the task was performed output was higher with a linear prize
structure (although there is evidence that cheating was more prevalent with
the winner-take-all prize structure). The second time the task was performed,
however, output was higher with the winner-take-all prize structure. More-
over, this change appeared to be driven by increased cheating in the case of
winner-take-all. Our results suggest that learning from feedback is a crucial
part of the picture.
In terms of the prior literature our approach is closest to that of Conrads et al.
(2014). They consider two player tournaments in which subjects self report
the outcome of a die role. In their T5 treatment the winner receives 5 and
the loser 0, in the T3 treatment the respective payoffs are 4 to 1 and in the
T3 treatment they are 3 to 2. This is similar to our approach in comparing
a winner-take-all prize structure with more linear incentives. They find that
output (and therefore cheating) increases as the prize spread widens. Our
experiment differs in that we consider larger groups (size 6) and experience.
This difference seems crucial given that we only find higher output in the
winner-take-all prize structure after experience.
A number of studies compare the effect of payment incentives on cheating
without directly comparing the winner-take-all and linear (or ranked) prize
structure. For instance, Conrads et al (2013) find more lying in a team setting
(where subjects are put in groups of two) compared to an individual setting,
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even though the strategic gain from lying is lower in the team than individual
setting.1 Cadsby, Song and Tapon (2010) compare piece rate with a bonus
based on absolute performance and a bonus based on relative performance.
Productivity was the same across the three schemes but cheating highest with
a bonus based on absolute performance. Schwieren and Weichselbaumer
(2010) compare a piece rate payment with a winner-take-all prize structure
in groups of 6. They find increased cheating with winner-take-all, driven by
subjects of lower ability. Finally, Cartwright and Menezes (2014) compare
cheating in a setting with no performance bonus, to a treatment where the
top 6 out of 15 receive a prize and one where the top 2 win a prize. They find,
as predicted by strategic incentives, that cheating is highest for intermediate
levels of competition where there are 6 prizes.
A related literature has looked at sabotage. For instance, Carpenter, Matthews
and Schirm (2010) compare piece rate with a tournament (which was piece
rate plus a bonus for the highest ranked worker) in settings where sabotage
is or is not possible. They find that sabotage is significant and crowded out
effort. In particular effort was lower in a tournament with sabotage because
subjects seemingly expected sabotage and so lowered own effort. Charness,
Masclet and Villeval (2013) find that subjects are willing to sabotage others
to improve their ranking - even if there are no material benefits to a higher
ranking. Tournaments and competition may, therefore, have a corrupting ef-
fect. For example, Kilduff et al. (2016) find that cheating depends partly on
rivalry and prior relations.
The broad lesson from these studies is that incentives influence cheating.
That, in turn, means that the optimal prize structure should take account of
the effect incentives will have on cheating. Our study reinforces that notion
with specific evidence on the winner-take-all prize structure and the role of
1Lying benefited the team-mate and so we may be observing altruistic lying.
Chapter 4. Prize distributions and the incentive to cheat 85
experience. We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces a benchmark case
of perfect monitoring. Section 3 provides theoretical results for this case and
Section 4 provides results for the case of imperfect monitoring. Section 5
outlines our experimental design and Section 6 the results. We conclude in
Section 7.
4.2 Perfect monitoring
We begin by considering a model in which there is perfect monitoring of
output. There is a set of players N = {1, ..., n} competing in a competition.
Each player i ∈ N simultaneously and independently chooses a level of effort
ei ∈ {0, 1} where 0 is interpreted as low effort and 1 as high effort. For
simplicity we assume effort can only take two levels but we do not believe
our results are overly sensitive to this assumption. Let h = ∑i∈N ei denote
the number of players who choose high effort and let h−i = h− ei denote the
number of players other than i who choose high effort.
Once all the players have chosen an effort level a ranking is determined from
lowest to highest. Let ri(ei, h−i) ∈ {1, ..., n} denote the ranking of player i
where ri = n indicates lowest and ri = 1 indicates highest. We assume that a
player who exerts high effort always beats a player who exerts low effort. The
ranking of players who exert the same level of effort is randomly determined
with each player having the same chance of a high ranking. Note that this is
consistent with all players being of the same ability. The probability of player
i ∈ N receiving rank k is, therefore,
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Pr(ri(ei, h) = k) =

1
h if ei = 1 and k ≤ h
0 if ei = 1 and k > h
0 if ei = 0 and k ≤ h
1
n−h if ei = 0 and k > h
(4.1)
Let Vk denote the prize received by a player ranked k where V1 ≥ V2 ≥ ... ≥
Vn. Also let the cost of high effort be given by c. The expected payoff of





Pr(ri(ei, h) = k)Vk − cei. (4.2)
So, the payoff of the player is his expected prize minus the cost, if any, of
high effort. A strategy for player i ∈ N consists of a probability pi ∈ [0, 1]
with which he chooses high effort. The expected payoff of player i ∈ N given
strategies p1, ..., pn is







Pr(ei, h−i|p1, ..., pn)ui(ei, h) (4.3)
where Pr(ei, h−i|p1, ..., pn) denotes the probability of outcome (ei, h−i).
Without loss of generality we can set Vn = 0. Let W = ∑k Vk denote the total
prize fund. In the following we pay special attention to two specific forms of
prize structure. (a) In a winner-take-all structure we set V2 = V3 = ... = Vn =
0 and V1 = W. As the name would suggest, this prize structure means that
only the highest ranked player receives a prize. (b) In a linear prize structure
we set Vk−1 −Vk = D > 0 for all k > 1. So, any increase in ranking results in





2Set D + 2D + ...+ (n− 1)D = W.
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Where appropriate we shall refer to the winner-take-all game and linear game
respectively to reflect the relevant prize structure.
4.3 Baseline theoretical results
Given that we have assumed all players are ex-ante identical it seems natural
to assume that all players will use the same strategy. We, therefore, focus on
symmetric strategy profiles in which p1 = ... = pn = p. We now consider
in turn the winner-take-all and linear prize structure and solve for the set of
symmetric Nash equilibria.
4.3.1 Winner-take-all game
Consider, first, the winner-take-all prize structure and fix a probability p that
every other player chooses high effort. The expected payoff of player i ∈ N
if he chooses low effort is given by
pii(ei = 0, p) = (1− p)n−1 Wn . (4.5)
This expression captures the fact that the player can only be highest ranked,
and therefore win the prize, if every other player also chooses low effort. In
this case he has a one in n chance of winning. The expected payoff of player
i ∈ N if he chooses high effort is given by











This expression captures the fact that the player has a one in g + 1 chance
of being highest ranked where g is the number of other players who choose
high effort.
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Let us first consider whether p = 1 can be a Nash equilibrium. This would
require that pii(ei = 1, p = 1) ≥ pii(ei = 0, p = 1). Substituting in the
relevant payoffs and rearranging gives result: p=1 is a Nash equilibrium of





Consider next whether p = 0 can be a Nash equilibrium. This would require
that pii(ei = 1, p = 0) ≤ pii(ei = 0, p = 0). Substituting in the relevant
payoffs and rearranging gives result: p = 0 is a Nash equilibrium of the





Note that c?? ≤ c? for n > 2 and so there is a range of values of c where
neither p = 1 nor p = 0 are a Nash equilibrium. In this case we looked for a

















An explicit expression for the value of p that solves this equation is not ob-
tainable. For specific values of c, W and n it is possible, however, to solve for
the equilibrium value of p.
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4.3.2 Linear game
Consider now the linear prize structure. The expected payoff of player i ∈ N
if he chooses low effort is given by
















This expression captures the fact that the player will effectively be competing
with the n− 1− g players who choose low effort (where g is the number of
players who choose high effort) for the lower rankings. The expected payoff
of player i ∈ N if he chooses high effort is given by
















This expression captures the fact that the player is effectively competing with
g other players who chose high effort for higher rankings.
In this new context we consider afresh whether p = 1 can be a Nash equilib-
rium. Setting pii(ei = 1, p = 1) ≥ pii(ei = 0, p = 1) and rearranging gives






Note that cˆ = c? if we impose condition (4.4).
Consider next whether p = 0 can be a Nash equilibrium. Setting pii(ei =
1, p = 0) ≤ pii(ei = 0, p = 0) and rearranging gives result: p = 0 is a Nash
equilibrium of the linear game if and only if c ≥ cˆ. Thus, setting aside the
limiting case of c = cˆ we find that the linear game only gives rise to pure
strategy Nash equilibria. If the cost of effort is more than cˆ then everyone
exerts high effort and if it is less than cˆ then everyone exerts low effort.
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4.3.3 Comparison of incentives
Table 1 summarizes our findings so far. We can immediately see from this
analysis that the winner-take-all structure is expected to elicit at least as high
a level of effort as the linear structure. To put some context on this let us,
without loss of generality, fix W = 1. It is, therefore, sufficient to consider
only c and n. We have c? = cˆ = 1/n and c?? = (n− 1)/n. So, the larger is n
the more incentives in the winner-take-all and linear prize structure diverge.
Indeed, for large n, the equilibrium prediction in the linear game is of nobody
choosing high effort (unless the cost of effort is very low) while in the winer-
take-all game we still see a positive probability of high effort.
TABLE 4.1: Equilibrium predictions for different incentives.
Winner-take-all Linear
If c ≤ c? p = 1 p = 1
If c?? > c > c? 0 < p < 1 p = 0
If c ≥ c?? p = 0 p = 0
To gain additional insight, Table 4.1 plots the equilibrium value of p in the
winner-take-all game for three different values of n. Hence, the equilibrium
probability of high effort in the winner-take-all game drops steeply towards
zero beyond c?. The probability of at least one player choosing high effort
remains above zero, denoted as 1 − (1 − p)n. If, for instance, we consider
c = 0.5 the equilibrium probability of at least one player choosing high effort
is 0.88, 0.80 and 0.71 respectively for n = 3, 10 and 20. This compares to an
equilibrium probability of 0 in the linear game.
We see, therefore, a very different set of incentives in the winner-take-all
game as compared to the linear game. This is as expected given the prior lit-
erature (Sisak 2009). The key thing we want to explore are the consequences
of cheating. For this we need to slightly extend the model.
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FIGURE 4.1: Equilibrium value of p for winner-take-all game.
4.4 Imperfect monitoring
Suppose that there is a way for a player to achieve the rewards from high ef-
fort without paying cost c. Specifically, suppose that each player i ∈ N simul-
taneously and independently chooses between level of effort ei ∈ {0, 1, Q}
where 0 is low effort, 1 is high effort and Q is to cheat. Let bi denote the cost
to player i of cheating which includes possible sanctions if caught and any
psychological cost of cheating. We make no assumption at this stage that bi
is more or less than the cost of effort c. For some players the cost of cheating
may be less than that of effort (because, say, they have nothing to lose) and
for some it is more (because of potential costs to reputation).
We will assume that those who cheat gain a high ranking. We, therefore,
have in mind a setting where the gains to cheating are potentially high. For
instance, the person willing to lie on their CV or fabricate experimental data
can easily outdo the hard work of others. Let h denote the number of players
who choose high effort and q denote the number who cheat. Then extending
equation (1) we have the probability of player i ∈ N receiving rank k is,
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Pr(ri(ei, h, q) = k) =

1
q if ei = Q and k ≤ q
0 if ei = Q and k > q
1
h if ei = 1 and q < k ≤ h + q
0 if ei = 1 and k < q or k > h + q
0 if ei = 0 and k ≤ h + q
1
n−h−q if ei = 0 and k > h + q.
Expected payoff is naturally extended to include the possibility of cheating,




Pr(ri(ei, h, g) = k)Vk −m(ei)
where m(0) = 0, m(1) = c and m(Q) = bi.
Insights from the analysis of the previous section naturally extend to this
more complex environment in which we have three possible actions and het-
erogeneity of costs. Let us begin with the simpler case of a linear prize struc-
ture.
4.4.1 Linear game
Suppose that ej = 0 for all j ∈ N and consider the incentives of player i. Ap-
plying the analysis of section 4.2 we see that player i would have an incentive
to cheat if and only if bi < c and bi < c? = W/n. The possibility to cheat only,
therefore, influences incentives if it is relatively low cost. And the larger the
n the lower need be costs. Small costs are, therefore, enough to deter cheat-
ing and there is now extensive evidence that lying typically involves some
psychological costs (Gneezy et al. 2013). In interpretation we can see that the
incentives to increase ranking in the linear prize structure are low. As a con-
sequence there is little incentive to put in effort and, equally, little incentive
to cheat. The possibility to cheat may, therefore, make little difference.
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We should, however, recognize that if someone faces no cost, psychological
or otherwise, from cheating, bi = 0, then clearly they have an incentive to
cheat. This means that some may cheat. How does this change the incentives
of others? Suppose that player i believes that proportion l of the popula-
tion has no psychological cost for lying, and will therefore cheat. Assuming
players are randomly selected from the population we get
































It follows that the higher is l the less incentive to cheat. So, if bi < c? = W/n
player i has no incentive to cheat irrespective of the effort or cheating he
expects of others. Overall, therefore, we may expect some to cheat (because
cheating has no direct material cost) but cheating should not be widespread
given psychological costs.
Also note that cheating does not crowd out effort. At a simplistic level this is
because there is limited incentive for effort with our without the possibility of
cheating. At a slightly deeper level, however, we can see that the incentives
to exert effort are relatively unaffected by cheating. In particular, if bi > c,
and so cheating is more costly for player i than effort, then player i may have
an incentive to exert effort. This is because effort would still push player i up
the ranking and any gains in ranking have the same marginal benefit.
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4.4.2 Winner-take-all game
Let us consider afresh what happens if ej = 0 for all j ∈ N. Applying the
analysis of section 4.3.1 we see that player i would have an incentive to cheat
if and only if bi < c and bi < c?? = W(n− 1)/n. For large n the condition
bi < c?? is likely to be satisfied in a setting where cheating cannot be moni-
tored. An equilibrium with no cheating would, therefore, seem unlikely. In
interpretation, this is because cheating would result in a large material gain
and so the psychological cost from lying would have to be very large to de-
ter that. This compares with a linear game where cheating only marginally
increases expected payoff and so is less ‘tempting’.
If some players cheat, or are expected to cheat, how does that change the
incentives of others? If player i expects that at least one other player will
cheat then the payoff from not cheating (whether he puts in effort or not) is
0. Cheating is, therefore, the only hope of a positive payoff. In short, we see
that cheating replaces effort as the determinant of the prize winning alloca-
tion. If cheating is less costly than effort then we can expect more cheating in
equilibrium than we would expect high effort in a setting with perfect mon-
itoring. And it is interesting to note that the psychological costs of cheating
may be diminished in settings where cheating is ‘normalized’ (Eber, 2012). If,
therefore, cheating is expected the costs of cheating are even less.
4.4.3 Differential consequences of imperfect monitoring
Let us summarize and reiterate some of the points made above. In the linear
game we see that there is relatively little incentive to exert effort or cheat.
Only those with a very low cost of cheating will have an incentive to cheat.
Also cheating should not completely crowd out effort in the sense that, for
those who prefer effort to cheating, the incentives to exert effort remain, if
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somewhat diminished. By contrast, in the winner-take-all game we see that
there is a much larger incentive to cheat. Moreover, cheating can be expected
to completely crowd out effort because effort cannot compete against cheat-
ing.
If we consider effort is ‘good’ and cheating is ‘bad’ then we see that the op-
timal prize structure depends on monitoring. If monitoring is perfect then
the winner-take-all prize structure best incentivizes effort. But, in the case
of imperfect monitoring, the winner-take-all prize structure may merely in-
centivize cheating. If so, the linear prize structure would be preferable. To
investigate this further we need a better understanding of individual’s will-
ingness to cheat in competitive settings. If, for instance, people cheat with
impunity, then cheating will be high under a linear prize structure as well as
winner-take-all. This motivates our experiment.
4.5 Experiment design
We employed a 2x2 between subject design that varied the prize structure
and priming for output monitoring. In each session subjects were dispersed
around a large classroom. They were then given 10 minutes to solve as
many mazes as they could from a booklet with 10 mazes. The mazes, taken
from https://krazydad.com/mazes/, are difficult and so the ‘average’ per-
son could only be realistically expected to solve two to four mazes in the
10 minutes. An example of a maze is given in Appendix A.3 Subjects were
given a sheet to record their outcomes. On the sheet they were asked to write
the time they finished each maze, from a countdown clock projected onto a
screen at the front of the room and clearly visible to all. At the end of the 10
3An online maze game was used by Schwieren and Weichselbaumer (2010) (see also
Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini 2003).
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minutes they were asked to write down how many mazes in total they had
completed.
Subjects were told that their performance, measured by the number of mazes
completed, would be compared to 5 other randomly selected people taking
part in the experiment. Their performance will then be ranked from 1st (com-
pleted the most mazes) to 6th (completed the least). Ties were randomly re-
solved. Payment was then based on either a winner-take-all or linear prize
structure. In a winner-take-all treatment the subject received £20 if they were
ranked 1st and £5 otherwise. In a linear treatment the subject received £10 if
ranked 1st, £9 if ranked 2nd, down to £5 if ranked 6th. In both cases the total
prize fund is £45. Note that the minimum £5 was a form of show-up fee for
subjects. The Experiment was funded by the University of Kent and had a
budget of £1000.
We varied the priming subjects received in terms of monitoring. Let us clar-
ify that the number of mazes completed was not checked (during the exper-
iment) and so we were entirely reliant on self-reporting. Subtle differences
in the wording of the experiments made this more or less transparent to sub-
jects. Specifically, in a no-monitoring treatment subjects were told ‘Note that
you are free to draw on the maze if you want but all we require you to do is
write down the time on the record sheet.’ This makes explicit that there will
be no monitoring of output. In a monitoring treatment subjects were told ‘In
order that we can verify the maze was completed please indicate the correct
route on the maze. Note that we do not need this to be neat or tidy. We just
need to see that you found the correct path.’ This wording suggests there
will be monitoring and indeed we were able to subsequently check whether
mazes were completed as reported.4
4Monitoring treatment may require subjects to do something they do not need to do in
the no-monitoring treatment - i.e. draw on the maze - and this could slow things down. It is,
however, far more difficult to solve the maze without drawing on the paper (because these
are very difficult mazes) and so there should be no difference in practice.
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Given the instructions merely stated that performance will be compared to
5 randomly selected other people we were not constrained to explicitly put
subjects into groups of 6. This meant that an experimental session could have
any number of subjects (of 6 or above). A predetermined algorithm com-
pared performance and determined payoff based on subject number. At the
end of the task subjects were given feedback on their rank and the number
of mazes completed by the first ranked. The task was then repeated a second
time with the exact same incentive structure. This allows us to see if there are
any dynamic effects5. A total of 65 subjects too part split over four sessions
for each of the four treatments.
4.5.1 Experiment hypotheses
In the monitoring treatment subjects were primed to think that some form
of monitoring of their output would be performed. In particular, they were
asked to record a route on the maze. This meant that cheating could be ob-
served and subjects new that. At the very least, this should raise the psy-
chological cost of cheating and so this will be treated as our baseline case.
Consistent with the analysis of Section 3 we make the following hypothesis.6
Hypothesis 1: Output will be higher in the winner-take-all treatment than
linear treatment with monitoring.
5Subjects were informed at the start of the experiment that the experiment would consist
of multiple parts. They were not told that the specific task would be repeated twice.
6Our theoretical model assumed a discrete choice between low effort, high effort or cheat-
ing. In the experiment subjects had a continuous choice set in that they could expand more
or less effort and cheat a little or a lot. In practice we would argue that this difference is
not crucial. In particular, subjects in the experiment still face the basic choice between exert-
ing high effort or cheating. Moreover, the main results from our theoretical model are note
sensitive to the assumption of a binary choice between low and high effort.
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In the no monitoring treatment subjects were directly told that there would
be no monitoring. This means that cheating is not observable and so it seems
natural to hypothesize increased cheating.
Hypothesis 2: Output will be higher in the no monitoring treatments than
monitoring treatments.
Our main hypothesis, however, is that cheating will not fundamentally influ-
ence the output difference between the winner-take-all and linear treatments.
This reflects less incentive to cheat in the linear treatment.
Hypothesis 3: Output will be higher in the winner-take-all treatment than
linear treatment with no monitoring.
4.6 Results
For each subject and both rounds of the experiment we have the output (i.e.
number of mazes) that they self-report to having done. We also have the
book of mazes to verify (after the experiment) how many mazes they actually
solved. The difference between self-reported and actual output is a measure
of cheating. Recall that subjects in the no monitoring treatments were told
that they did not have to complete the maze book by hand. To complete a
maze without using a pen is, however, difficult and more time-consuming
that using a pen. We discount, therefore, the possibility that a subject solved
a maze without that being detectable from the maze booklet.
Our primary focus is on cheating. Let us, however, first look at self-reported
output. Table 2 shows the average of self-reported output by treatment in
rounds 1 and 2. We see that in round 1 the winner-take-all with no moni-
toring treatment has output lower than predicted (by both hypotheses 1 and
Chapter 4. Prize distributions and the incentive to cheat 99
2) compared to the other treatments (p = 0.04, two-sided Mann Whitney).
This ultimately drags down the overall output in the winner-take-all and no-
monitoring treatments.7 By round 2, however, the effect has disappeared.
Across the board we see a rise in output and the effect is particularly pro-
nounced in the winner-take-all with no-monitoring treatment. In round 2
there is evidence in support of Hypotheses 1 to 3 although the differences
across treatments are statistically insignificant (Mann Whitney test).
TABLE 4.2: Self-reported output by treatment and round.
Round 1 Round 2
Winner Linear Both Winner Linear Both
No monitor 2.56 3.37 2.97 3.78 3.58 3.68
Monitor 3.07 3.00 3.04 3.57 3.29 3.43
Both 2.78 3.21 3.69 3.45
The amount of cheating is detailed in Table 4.2, as measured by the dis-
crepancy between self-reported and actual output. In round 1 we can see,
as predicted, that there was more cheating in the no-monitoring treatments
(p = 0.09, one-sided Mann Whitney). Cheating, however, was lower in the
winner-take-all treatments (p = 0.68, two-sided Mann Whitney). By round 2
this effect has been reversed primarily because of a large increase in cheating
in the winner-take-all with no-monitoring treatment. Specifically, in round 2
we see an even bigger effect of monitoring (p = 0.04, two-sided Mann Whit-
ney) but still an insignificant effect of winner-take-all (p = 0.31, two sided
Mann Whitney). Although the amount of cheating is marginally higher in
the winner-take-all with no monitoring treatment than other treatments (p =
0.06, one-sided Mann Whitney).
To give additional insight Figure 4.2 plots the distribution of self-reported
output comparing the winner-take-all and linear-treatments. In the linear
treatments we can see a slight rightward shift in the distribution. In the
winner-take-all treatments there is a more pronounced shift to the right.
7All other pairwise comparisons are statistically insignificant.
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TABLE 4.3: Cheating by treatment and round
Round 1 Round 2
Winner Linear Both Winner Linear Both
No monitor 0.61 1.05 0.84 1.56 1.11 1.32
Monitor 0.36 0.21 0.29 0.57 0.29 0.43
Both 0.50 0.70 1.13 0.76
FIGURE 4.2: Distribution of self-reported output in linear and
winner-take-all treatments in round 1 (top) and round 2 (bot-
tom).
To formalize the analysis we report some regression results. We begin with
a Logit regression that take as a dependent variable whether or not a subject
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cheated. Table 4.4 provides the results looking at both rounds 1 and 2 sep-
arately. We can see that monitoring shows some effect on cheating, particu-
larly in round 2, but there is no evidence that the prize structure influenced
the probability of cheating.
TABLE 4.4: Logit Modelling, Round 1 & 2
R1 R2
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2)
All Pay 0.20 0.16 0.64 0.62
(0.66) (0.66) (0.58) (0.57)
Monitored -0.63 -0.68 -0.99 -0.97
(0.67) (0.66) (0.58)* (0.59)*
Number of Mazes 0.84 0.95 0.63 0.48
(Stated complete) (0.37)*** (0.28)*** (0.29)** (0.18)***
In Round
Average time -0.34 0.13
Per Maze (0.44) (0.23)
(minutes)
Constant -2.67 -3.81 -3.24 -2.25
(1.72) (1.08)*** (1.75)*** (0.82)***
Observations 65 65 65 65
Likelihood Ratio χ2 17.25*** 16.61*** 13.19** 12.76***
Pseudo r2 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.15
Next we can look at the absolute amount of cheating as given by the dis-
crepancy between actual and self-reported output in Table 4.5. We report the
results of tobit regressions8 with the discrepancy as the dependent variable.
Again we see that the lack of monitoring does increase cheating but the type
8 Where p? < 0.1, p?? < 0.05 p??? < 0.01
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of prize structure does not. The winner-take-all coefficient is, though, posi-
tive and so there is some sign that cheating is higher in the winner-take-all
treatments.
TABLE 4.5: Tobit Modelling for cheating in Round 1 & Round 2
R1 R2
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2)
All Pay 0.33 0.31 0.85 0.83
(0.82) (0.83) (0.79) (0.79)
Monitored -1.29 -1.32 -2.01 -2.04
(0.83) (0.84) (0.85)** (0.85)**
Number of Mazes 1.08 1.26 1.09 0.89




Average time -0.57 0.21
Per Maze (0.55) (0.33)
(minutes)
Constant -2.94 -4.95 -5.07 -3.60
(2.24) (1.62)*** (2.51)** (1.23)***
Observations 65 65 65 65
Uncensored 18 18 24 24
Likelihood Ratio χ2 20.11*** 18.90*** 20.67*** 20.18***
Pseudo r2 0.15 0.22 0.12 0.12
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4.7 Conclusions
In this Chapter we have compared theoretically and experimentally a contest
with a winner-take-all prize structure to one with a linear prize structure.
We also compared a setting which primed for monitoring of output to one
with no monitoring. Our theoretical results suggested that output would be
higher with the winner-take-all prize structure. In fact we found that effort
was lower with the winner-take-all the first time subjects did the task but
higher the second time they performed the task. This change was cause by a
rise in cheating the second time around.
One explanation for why we did not observe higher output the first time
subjects performed the task is risk aversion. Kalra and Shi (2001) show the
critical role of risk aversion. In their theoretical model they find that the
winner-take-all prize structure maximizes effort if players are risk neutral but
if they are risk averse the optimal incentive structure involves multiple win-
ners. Similarly, Krishna and Morgan (1998) find that winner-take-all prize
structure is optimal with 2 or 3 players and for 4 players if those players are
risk neutral. But if there are 4 risk averse players the optimal prize structure
involves 2 winners. While these results are derived for different models the
basic idea that risk aversion may diminish incentives to ‘go for’ a single prize
is intuitive.
Lim, Ahearne and Ham (2009), building on the approach of Kalra and Shi
(2001), find that effort is higher with multiple prizes in both a lab and field
experiment. Even so, our incentive structure is such that risk aversion (par-
ticular the mild risk aversion observed by Kalra and Shi (2001)) should still
leave the winner-take-all prize structure as the one that most incentives ef-
fort. So, the reason we observe less effort in the winner-take-all treatments is
still a puzzle. Although, our finding is not too dissimilar to that of Sheremeta
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(2011). He compares a winner-take-all contest to one with two different
prizes (more similar to our linear prize structure) and finds that output is
higher in the winner-take-all but only just, and with a difference much smaller
than predicted.
That output was higher with the winner-take-all prize structure the second
time subjects performed the task is the main thing we would emphasize. Our
prior hypothesis was that the possibility to cheat would not lead to exces-
sive cheating in the linear prize structure. As such, the winner-take-all prize
structure most incentives cheating. That we observe a dramatic shift the
second time subjects performed the task, while unexpected, reinforces this
hypothesis. Essentially, the second time they performed task subjects were
well aware that they could cheat with impunity (because they saw what hap-
pened the first time) and cheating rose dramatically in the winner-take-all
treatments.
So, the main implication we would take from our study is the need to take
into account the ability to monitor output when designing contest incentives
(see also Conrads et al. 2014). If output can be perfectly monitored and high
effort is considered desirable then the prize structure that maximizes output
is ideal. But what if output is imperfectly monitored? Then to incentivize
effort may be simply to incentive cheating, and that may not be desirable.
The linear prize structure, which minimizes cheating, may be optimal even
though it leads to lower output.
As an example consider doping in sport. Sport is primarily built around a
winner-take-all prize structure in which most of the rewards go to the top
athlete. This may incentivize effort. But, similarly, it may incentivize cheat-
ing through illicit doping or similar. The authorities need to consider which
prize structure best matches their ability to monitor output. Contrast, for ex-
ample, rowing and cycling. It would be naive to think that doping is not an
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issue in rowing (for instance 2004 Olympic gold medalist Sergei Fedorovt-
sev tested positive for a banned substance). Doping scandals have, however,
clearly plagued cycling over many decades, particularly with regard to the
Tour de France. The high stakes for success in cycling, compared to the rel-
atively evenly distributed rewards in rowing, are surely part of the explana-




5.1 Dishonesty in Sport
Sport, whether professional or amateur, presents many opportunities for ‘dis-
honest’ behaviour. Examples range from match fixing (a criminal offence),
to the use of prohibited performance enhancing drugs (violating the rules
of a governing body), to feigning injury for competitive advantage within a
game. Abundant evidence of dishonest behaviour exists (see, for instance,
Carpenter (2012) on match fixing, Dilger, Frick and Tolsdorf (2007), Pitsch,
Emrich and Klein (2007) and Pitsch and Emrich (2012) on doping in sport
and Kavussanu, Seal and Phillips (2006) on anti-social behaviour in football
games). But what motivates an athlete to cheat? In this paper we explore the
idea that an individual is more prone to dishonest behaviour when they are
engaged in sport than they are in other areas of life.
The literature, particularly on doping in sport, has identified a multitude of
potential factors that influence dishonest behaviour (see Morente-Sánchez
and Zabala 2013 and Ntoumanis et al. 2014 for reviews). Broadly speaking
within this web of social, contextual and personal influences we can catego-
rize factors into two types. First there are individual or attitudinal differences
that means some athletes are more willing to engage in dishonest behaviour.
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For instance, some may feel less negative emotions from cheating (Lazuras et
al. 2010), be more morally disengaged (Kavussanu 2008, Ring et al. 2018), get
less intrinsic enjoyment from sport (Ntoumanis and Standage 2009), believe
that others are more likely to cheat or have different expectations about likely
consequences (Mazanov and Huybers 2010). Here we get a between athlete
comparison in saying some are more likely to be dishonest than others 1. This
notion fits the common ‘tabloid’ characterization of doping as the dishonest
cheats versus the honest clean athletes.
A second category of factors that can influence cheating are cultural and sit-
uational influences from the sporting environment. For instance, the social
influence of team-mates, coaches and family can have a strong effect on the
decision to cheat (Ohl et al. 2015). Similarly, a young, injured athlete may
face a completely different cost-benefit trade-off to an experienced athlete
(Huybers and Mazanov 2012, Ring et al. 2018). Willingness to cheat has also
been found to correlate with strategic incentives such as the extent of com-
petition and spread of prize money (Schwieren and Weichselbaumer 2010,
Cartwright and Menzes 2014, Conrads et al. 2014). Crucially, this allows a
within athlete comparison in saying that a person may be more or less likely
to cheat depending on the environment within which he or she happens to
compete. Such subtleties fit less well the tabloid desire to distinguish cheats
versus honesyt but arguably have a great deal of support within the academic
literature.
Individual and environmental factors can interact in interesting ways. For
instance, different cultural and situational influences on a young athlete may
shape subsequent beliefs (Ntoumanis, Taylor and Thøgersen-Ntoumani 2012).
Or coaching style may have different effects depending on the underlying
1Cultural factors may feed into any between subject comparisons. Even so, taking that
cultural background as fixed and given we can then see that some athletes may be more
prone to dishonesty than others.
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motivation of the athlete (Hodge and Lonsdale 2011). More generally, a par-
ticular environmental factor may mean that a person becomes less morally
engaged. These interactions are crucial to the approach we take in this paper.
Our main claim is that sport, of itself, makes people less honest. Or to put
things differently, a person may be less honest in the sporting environment
than they would be in other areas of their life. We apply the social cognitive
theory of moral action and the theory of self-concept maintenance to argue
our point. Will shall see that various aspects of the sporting environment al-
low ‘honest people’ to ‘cheat a little’ and maintain high moral standards and
self-concept.
We also report on an experiment designed to test our main hypothesis that
the sporting environment makes people dishonest. Subjects undertook a
standard coin-tossing task in which there is the opportunity to be dishonest
(e.g. Bucciol and Piovesan 2011, Houser, Vetter amd Winter 2012, Gino and
Wiltermuth 2014, Pascual-Ezama et al. 2015). Specifically, a subject is paid
based on his or her self-reporting of ten coin-tosses. By recording dishon-
estly a subject could guarantee a maximum payoff of £10 (compared to the
expected fair payoff of £5). Our treatment variable was a priming task that
subjects performed before the coin-tossing task. Around half of the subjects
were given a series of three questions asking them to think about their expe-
rience with sport while the other half were gives questions about education.
We find significantly higher payoffs (and, therefore, dishonesty) following
the sport priming.
Our approach draws on that of Cohn, Fehr and Marechal (2014) who find
that workers employed in the banking industry are more dishonest when
primed to think about banking. The implication is that bankers are not dis-
honesty per-se but may behave dishonestly within a banking environment.
Similarly, our results point to the potential corrupting effect of the sporting
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environment. As we discuss in below, there may be limits on how much the
climate of sport can be changed. Even so, a recognition that sport may have a
tendency to ‘bring out the worst in people’ may be useful in designing incen-
tives to discourage dishonest behaviour. It also may help in keeping some
perspective on the immorality of cheating in sport. In particular, our analy-
sis suggests that cheating in sport does not necessarily mean an individual
would be any more dishonest than others in different areas of life.
Before we proceed to the theoretical discussion let us highlight two specific
aspects of our experimental design. First, dishonesty cannot be observed
(and the subject knows that). If, therefore, a subject behaves honestly that
must because of internal or intrinsic motivation rather than, say, any fear of
social disapproval. This is not to say that external forces are not relevant.
A footballer may, for instance, be less likely to feign injury in a game being
shown live on television, with cameras all-around, than in a lower league
game with few people watching. There are, though, many opportunities to
cheat in sport without anyone knowing (at least in principle) whether that be
doping, match fixing or on-field actions. We shall, therefore, focus here on
intrinsic motivation.
A second aspect of our experimental design is that subjects can cheat a lit-
tle (or a lot). The possibility to cheat less than is theoretically possible can
be a crucial factor in incentivizing someone to cheat (Gneezy, Kajackaite and
Sobel 2018). In elaborating on this point let us highlight that sport is rel-
atively unique in the extent of its rules. Such rules means that cheating is
objectively verifiable, in principle, even for the most minor of rule violations.
This directly reduces an athlete’s wiggle room to claim a particular behaviour
‘is not cheating’. If, however, cheating falls on a continuum between minor
and major it restores some wiggle room to ‘interpret’ minor transgressions
as honesty. This is clearly a relevant factor in sport where the opportunities
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to cheat fall on a wide spectrum from very minor rule violations, such as a
golfer failing to replace their ball in exactly the right place, to illegal activity,
such as a golfer accepting money to shoot a particular score on a hole.
5.2 Moral Disengagement
A large literature has looked at moral disengagement in sport, drawing on
and applying Bandura’s (1991) Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Action.
Given the extent of the literature (see, for instance, the excellent review arti-
cle of Boardley and Kavussanu 2011) we limit ourselves here to picking up
some issues that seem pertinent to the topic at hand. The underlying idea
behind Bandura’s (1991) Theory is that an individual seeks internal (or exter-
nal) approval for ‘moral’ acts and fears disapproval for ‘immoral’ acts. This,
though, is insufficient to rule out immoral acts because the individual may
use mechanisms of moral disengagement to consciously inhibit moral stan-
dards (Boardley and Kavussanu 2011).
Moral disengagement is conventionally viewed at a between athlete level. In
particular, some athletes may feel less strongly about immorality or may find
it easier to inhibit moral standards. For our purposes it is interesting to look
at the within athlete level and ask whether an individual may find it easier
to inhibit moral standards in sport than other areas of life. Bandura (1991,
1999) distinguished eight mechanisms of moral disengagement, which were
converted to a sporting context by Boardley and Kavussanu (2007, 2008).
In working our way through these eight mechanisms we very loosely par-
tition them into three sets to capture specific aspects of the sporting environ-
ment. These aspects are the existence of clearly defined rules, competition
and teamwork.
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One very specific aspect of sport is that it takes place within clearly defined
rules and in a clearly defined setting. In a golf tournament, cycle tour or
football match, for instance, there is a rule book that defines precisely what is
and what is not allowed and there are referees and umpires to make sure the
rules are adhered to. We can think of no other aspect of life with such clearly
defined rules. This is not to say that ambiguity is completely removed but
there is, for instance, far more ambiguity in, say, the application of employee
contracts and employment law within the workplace. A lack of ambiguity on
the rules has the direct effect of making it harder to justify cheating because
there is less wiggle room. Indirectly, however, the clearly defined nature of
the sporting arena may make it easier to inhibit immoral behaviour.
One thing to consider is the notion that ‘what happens on the pitch stays on
the pitch’. Consider the image of rugby players who stamp on each other,
gouge out each other’s eyes and then, at the final whistle, shake hands and
go and share a beer together (Daniell 2009). This caricature suggests that
anti-social behaviour on the field of play is different to anti-social behaviour
off the field. There is a sense in which anti-social behaviour is a part of sport.
The clear dividing line between the sporting and non-sporting arena that
facilitates this transition. As does the fact that opponents on the field may be
good friends off the field (because they are, say, former teammates or know
each other well over many years of competing together). Two mechanisms
we can bring into the discussion at this point are advantageous comparison
and distortion of consequences.
Advantageous comparison allows someone to inhibit moral standards by
recognising that there are worse things that could have been done. Distortion
of consequences involves the cognitive minimization of anti-social outcomes.
By way of illustration, Boardley and Kavussanu (2007) measure these mech-
anisms with the questions, respectively, ‘shouting at an opponent is okay as
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long as it does not end in violent conduct’ and ‘insults among players do
not really hurt anyone’. The notion that what happens on the pitch stays on
the pitch suggests a lot of room for advantageous comparison and distortion
of consequences. In particular, anything that happens in the name of sport
could be claimed as less bad than things which happen outside of sport.
Another related aspect of sport is that it is competitive. The objective is ‘to
win’. This would seem to allow further leeway to excuse behaviour that hap-
pens in the name of sport. To expand on this let us bring in three more mech-
anisms. Euphemistic labelling is a way of disguising immoral behaviour,
such as ‘bending the rules is a way of evening things up’. Dehumanization
is a way of reducing opponents to non-human level, such as ‘it is okay to
treat badly an opponent who behaves like an animal’. Finally, attribution of
blame is to pass on blame to victims, such as ‘players who are mistreated
have usually done something to deserve it’ (Boardley and Kavussanu 2007).
All three of these mechanisms would appear to be easier to apply in a sport-
ing context given the clearly defined environment and competitive nature of
that environment. For instance, it is easier to say that a sporting opponent is
behaving like an animal than to say someone in everyday life is behaving like
an animal. It is excusable, maybe even part of sport with some euphemistic
labelling, for someone to behave that way. Moreover, this can justify reacting
in-kind. Similarly, blame could be attributed on the sporting environment
itself. Its competitive nature would seem to positively invite ‘bending the
rules’ as much as possible.
One further factor in sport is the integral notion of teamwork. Even in indi-
vidual sports an athlete may feel responsibility to coaches, parents and others
who have helped along the way. With this in mind we can introduce the final
three mechanisms. Moral justification is a mechanism for turning bad into
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good, such as ‘it is okay for players to lie to officials if it helps the team’. Dis-
placement of responsibility sees a person shift responsibility on social pres-
sures, such as ‘a player should not be blamed for injuring an opponent if the
coach reinforces such behaviour’. Finally, diffusion of responsibility sees a
person diffuse blame through the group, such as ‘it is unfair to blame players
who only play a small part in unsportsmanlike tactics used by their team’.
The strong notion of teamwork inherent in sport allows ready appeal to all
three of these mechanisms.
In this section we have argued that sport has unique characteristics – namely
clearly defined rules, competition and teamwork – that facilitate the eight
mechanisms of moral disengagement recognised by Bandura (1999) and Board-
ley and Kavussanu (2007). That would suggest that sport is an environment
where we may see enhanced dishonesty. In making this point it is worth
clarifying that this is not just because consequences are less in sport. To il-
lustrate, consider a footballer who deliberately sets out to injure an opponent
and in doing so does such a bad tackle that it ends the opponent’s career. The
footballer can use all the mechanisms of moral justification, displacement of
responsibility, etc. Ultimately, though, the footballer has changed someone
else’s life in a fundamental way. It would seem fair to say that the footballer
who would be highly unlikely to perform such an act away from the football
pitch would provide selective moral disengagement.
5.3 Self-Concept Maintenance
In the preceding section we focused on the Social Cognitive Theory of Moral
Action. In this section we consider related theories of moral action begin-
ning with the Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance (Mazar, Amir and Ariely
2008). This theory starts with the notion that most people value honesty, have
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a strong belief in their own morality and strive to maintain this positive self-
concept. An individual, therefore, will typically only behave dishonestly if
they can do so in a way that does not threaten their positive self-concept. Or,
put somewhat differently, the individual must overcome the ethical disso-
nance that results from an inconsistency between own behaviour and ethical
values (Ayal and Gino 2011).
There are various cognitive tricks (or mechanisms) that someone can em-
ploy to maintain positive self-concept. Mazar et al. (2008) highlight two such
tricks – categorization and attention to standards. Categorization is a process
of interpreting actions in a way that makes them seem more morally accept-
able. While the lower the attention to standards the easier it is for an indi-
vidual to cheat and maintain self-concept. There are clear parallels here with
the eight mechanisms discussed in the previous section. For instance, moral
justification and euphemistic labelling are forms of categorization. Also one
could argue that attention to standards are lower in sport because ‘it is just
sport’ and ‘what happens on the pitch stays on the pitch’.
Shalvi et al. (2015) further develop a theory of ethical dissonance distinguish-
ing between pre-violation and post-violation justifications for immoral be-
haviour. As the names would suggest, pre-violation justifications are tricks
an individual can use to justify actions he wants to choose while post-violation
justifications are used to lessen the dissonance from an action already cho-
sen. They discuss three types of pre-violation justification – ambiguity, self-
serving altruism and moral licensing – and three types of post-violation justi-
fication – cleansing, confessing and distancing. Self-serving altruism (similar
to the moral justification mechanism and also sometimes called local social
utility) is the idea that immoral behaviour which benefits others is easier to
justify (Gino, Ayal and Ariely 2009). This, as we have already discussed
above, has clear relevance in a sporting context where actions can benefit
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team members. Indeed, we may see a form of team moral disengagement
(Mallia et al. 2016). Distancing (similar to the displacement and diffusion
of responsibility mechanisms) primarily involves pointing to other immoral
acts done by others. This, again, is easy to see as relevant in sport.
From our perspective, the more novel cognitive tricks coming out of the ap-
proach of Shalvi et al. (2015) are those of moral licensing, cleansing and con-
fessing. The idea behind moral licensing is that an individual will find it
easier to justify immoral behaviour if he has recently engaged in pro-social
behaviour. Sport is often associated with pro-social acts whether that be char-
itable work, support and mentoring of children and young athletes, or sim-
ply giving a supporter an autograph. Such acts, particularly given that they
are often directly related to the individual’s sport, may offer a ready excuse
for immoral behaviour. For instance, the footballer who visited the local hos-
pital on Friday, to do some charitable work on behalf of his club, may use this
as a justification for immoral behaviour in a game on the Saturday. Similarly,
interacting with young supporters before and after the game may counteract
immoral behaviour.
Cleansing is a physical or symbolic process of ‘washing’ away immoral be-
haviour. So, showering after a game and putting on a shiny suit may do
more than wash away the dirt. Again, we see here the importance of that
clear distinction between what happens on and off the pitch. Pain is also a
recognized form of cleansing that may be relevant to sport. Confession is the
process of recognizing immoral acts in order to obtain forgiveness. Interest-
ingly, however, the evidence suggests individuals may choose to confess a
little and deny they did anything particularly bad (Peer, Acquisti and Shalvi
2014). This is another form of advantageous comparison. In sport there are
ample opportunities for confession such as talking to teammates, opponents,
or the media after a game. Indeed, within a team there may be a collective
Chapter 5. Framing and Dishonesty 116
process of confession and deflection through advantageous comparison.
In comparison to the Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Action the Theory of
Self-Concept puts slightly more emphasis on the interaction between cogni-
tive tricks and the choice environment. A particular relevant issue for us is
the idea of cheating ‘a little bit’ (which is not unrelated to the idea we have
just discussed of confessing ‘a little bit’). The evidence suggests people more
readily cheat a little bit than a lot (e.g. Hilbig and Hessler 2013, Gneezy et al.
2018). Both categorization and low attention to standards allow someone to
cheat a little bit and maintain self-concept. For example, the golfer that fails
to replace her ball in the right spot can claim that on the scale of things that
is a small violation. If that is ‘all she has done’ then she is an honest golfer.
More generally, there are host of ways in which an individual can cognitively
re-interpret cheating ‘a little bit’ as a good thing. It readily allows for advan-
tageous comparison and distortion of consequences because the individual
‘could have done worse’. It also allows for self-serving altruism in that the
individual ‘helps’ an opponent by not doing worse. Similarly, it allows for
distancing because others ‘would have done worse’.
With this in mind let us consider again the consequences of sport being a
domain with a clearly defined set of rules. The direct effect of a reduction
in ambiguity is to provide a barrier to immoral behaviour. For instance, the
rules of golf are unambiguous on the procedures that need to be followed
when replacing a ball (and at a professional level referees would be on hand
to advise if necessary). So, a player cannot reasonably claim ‘they did not
know’. To adhere to all the rules, all the time, would, however, be superhu-
man. Precisely because the rules of sport are so clearly defined down to the
finest detail, it becomes almost inevitable that an individual at some point is
going to bend the rules ‘just a little bit’. The golfer is not going to replace her
ball in exactly the right spot, the footballer is going to push an opponent off
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balance, the basketball player is going to travel more than allowed, and so
on.
If minor violations of rules can easily be justified then minor violations may
become normal. For example, it may become a norm that anything the ref-
eree or umpire does not spot is not cheating (even if it is a clear violation of
the rules). This is a potentially slippery slope to further, and more serious,
immoral behaviour. For instance, doping in sport may result from a pro-
cess in which athletes move from supplements and legal substances (with
potentially invasive methods of deliver) to banned substances (Moller 2009).
Behavior can also be influenced by others (Gino, Ayal and Ariely 2009) cre-
ating a dangerous cycle. For example, Kavussanu, Seal and Phillips (2006)
observe increased anti-social behaviour through young adolescence which
appears to be influenced by the motivational climate in the team.
5.4 Cost-Benefit Analysis
The theory of self-concept Maintenance is based on individuals (explicitly or
implicitly) weighing up the costs and benefits of dishonesty. This crucially
implies that dishonesty will be increasing in the potential gains from dishon-
esty. There is ample evidence that individuals do respond to strategic in-
centives to lie in competitive environments (Schwieren and Weichselbaumer
2010, Cartwright and Menezes 2014, Conrads et al. 2014). In particular dis-
honesty is positively related to the expected gains from dishonesty.
Consequently, an individual’s willingness to engage in dishonest behavior
in sport is likely to depend on incentives such as prize money and the gains
from winning, particularly if we look at pre-meditated behavior like doping.
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The key point to appreciate is that the sporting arena may provide an envi-
ronment where the rewards to cheating are relatively high. This will depend
on the sport and type of competition but the highly attritional nature of sport
combined with a winner takes all reward system means that small acts of
cheating can potentially yield large payoffs. If so, then putting aside all of
the arguments made in the previous two sections, we would still expect to
see higher levels of dishonesty in sport than most other areas of life. But
these various factors are likely to be reinforcing. For instance, if sport is an
environment when cheating is more prevalent then the various mechanism
and justifications discussed above become reinforced. So, competition can be
a mediating factor in justifying dishonesty.
5.5 Methods
5.5.1 Participants
Participants were 152 members of the general public (83 male). The study
was conducted over three sessions on the University of Kent campus. One
session was run on an open day and the subsequent two sessions were widely
advertised around the university. Participants could drop-in at any time and
take part during the course of a session (with no participant allowed to take
part more than once). The participants ranged in age from 16 to 68 with an
average of 23.4 (SD = 8.0). Participation lasted around 10-15 minutes.
5.5.2 Measures
Honesty, or dishonesty, was measured using a coin tossing task based on that
of Cohn et al. (2014). Specifically, participants were told ‘You now have the
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chance to win some money. We want you to toss a coin 10 times. Depending
on whether the coin comes down heads or tails (see below) you can win £1.
We ask you to record for each toss whether or not you win the £1 (please circle
yes or no). Once you have finished please enter in the box below your total
winnings. For instance, if you win 8 times please enter £8. Then bring over
all your sheets and we will pay you the amount you have won.’ Participants
then filled in a table similar to Table 1 and entered total winnings.
TABLE 5.1: A copy of the table participants were asked to fill in
recording how much money they won.
Heads Tails Did You Win?
Toss 1 Win £1 Do not win Yes No
Toss 2 Do Not win Win £1 Yes No
Toss 3 Win £1 Do not win Yes No
Toss 4 Do Not win Win £1 Yes No
Toss 5 Win £1 Do not win Yes No
Toss 6 Do Not win Win £1 Yes No
Toss 7 Win £1 Do not win Yes No
Toss 8 Do Not win Win £1 Yes No
Toss 9 Win £1 Do not win Yes No
Toss 10 Do Not win Win £1 Yes No
The crucial thing to appreciate is that participants tossed the coin and filled
in the table without any independent verification of the coin tosses. Partici-
pants could, thus, report any outcome. This creates the incentive to behave
dishonestly and report high winnings. Note, however, that we cannot tell
whether an individual participant was dishonest or not. For instance, a par-
ticipant may genuinely win £10 because of the way the coin lands. Our focus
is, thus, on treatment differences in observed winnings. Specifically we will
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compare the winnings of participants exposed to a sporting prime with those
exposed to a neutral education prime, looking for a shift in the distribution of
winnings. This approach allows participants freedom to behave dishonestly
without any judgement from the experimenter, as is standard in experimen-
tal work on dishonesty (Cohn et al. 2014).
5.5.3 Procedures
Participants were recruited from those attending a University open day (ses-
sion 1) and from across the University population (sessions 2 and 3). They
were informed that participation was voluntary and that data was anony-
mous. They were then asked to fill in a five part survey. The first three parts
are unrelated to the present study (two parts on a public good game and
one on attitudes to cyber-security). Part 4 was our priming task which we
shall describe shortly. Part 5 is the coin tossing task discussed above.The
experiment was funded by the University of Kent and the budget for the
experiment was set at £1250.
Approximately half of the participants (74 out of 152) were given a sporting
prime and the others an education prime. Following the approach of Cohn
et al. (2014) both primes began with questions on life satisfaction. First they
were asked (on an 11 point Likert scale) ‘How satisfied are you at present
with your life in general?’. Then they were asked four questions (on a 6
point Likert scale) ‘Happiness means for you that you. . . and your family are
healthy? Are able to enjoy small things? Have time for your own interests?
Don’t have to worry about money?’ Participants were then exposed to the
prime.
Participants in the sport prime were asked: ‘Do you currently play sport, or
have you played sport in the past? If so, which sports and at what level?’,
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‘What personal characteristics do you think are important to be a successful
sportsperson?’, and ‘What are the most memorable sporting moments that
you have been involved in, as a participant or spectator?’. Each question had
a box for subjects to write an answer. Participants in the education prime
were asked: ‘What is your level of education and have you any experience of
teaching?’, ‘What personal characteristics do you think are important to be a
successful teacher?’ and ‘What are the most memorable moments you have
from teaching, either as a pupil, student or teacher?’.
The role of the prime is to expose subjects to either a sporting or neutral ed-
ucational frame before the coin tossing task. Our main hypothesis was that
participants would be more likely to behave dishonestly in the coin tossing
task after they had been exposed to the sporting prime. Participants were
randomly assigned to a prime within each session. The life satisfaction ques-
tions are the same for all participants and so allow a basic test of homogene-
ity between treatments. After completing the coin tossing task participants
could hand in their sheets and be paid. The average payoff was £5.53.
5.6 Results
5.6.1 Life Satisfaction
The five questions that participants were asked about life satisfaction are not
of interest, of themselves, but do provide a basic test of unobserved hetero-
geneity between treatments. As Table 2 reports we find no differences be-
tween treatments.
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TABLE 5.2: Life Satisfaction by Treatment and results of Mann-
Whitney Two-sided test.
Question Education Sport z P
Life in General 7.59 7.36 0.75 0.46
Family are Healthy 4.61 4.57 0.22 0.82
Enjoy Small things 4.08 4.03 0.08 0.93
Own Interests 4.13 4.08 0.60 0.55
Money 3.89 4.06 -1.10 0.27
5.6.2 Education Prime
Figure 5.1 plots observed winnings and those expected according to the bi-
nomial distribution (with a fair coin). You can see a pronounced skew to
the right relative to the binomial distribution. This would suggest some dis-
honesty. A binomial test does not, however, provide compelling evidence
that winnings are not random, p = 0.054 one-sided test with 413 successes
out of 780 tosses. This level of honesty is consistent with prior experimental
evidence (Cohn et al. 2014, Abeler, Nonsenzo and Raymond 2018).
FIGURE 5.1: Observed winnings in the education treatment and
those expected by chance
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5.6.3 Sporting Prime
Figure 5.2 plots the distribution of wins in the sporting treatment compared
to the education treatment. The distribution shows that with a sport priming
there is a clear shift to the right. Hence, with the sport prime we can reject
the null hypothesis that winnings are random,Additionally, a two-sided rank
sum test shows significantly higher winnings in the sport treatment, z = -2.24
and p = 0.025. Hence, the evidence supports our hypothesis that dishonesty
is higher with the sporting prime.
FIGURE 5.2: Observed winnings in the sport and education
treatments
5.6.4 Gender and Age
Table 5.3 reports the results of OLS regressions 2 in which the dependent vari-
able is the number of wins and the independent variables include a dummy
for sport framing, a dummy for male, age, a dummy for student, a dummy
if the student said they were experienced in sport (this information is only
available for those in the sport frame) and the 5 measures of life satisfaction
(not reported here). Specification (1) simply includes the sport dummy while
specification (2) includes all variables. As expected the number of wins is
2 Where p? < 0.1, p?? < 0.05 p??? < 0.01
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TABLE 5.3: OLS regression results with number of heads as the
dependent variable
Variable (1) (2)








TABLE 5.4: Poisson regression results with number of heads as
the dependent variable
Variable (1) (2)




Experienced in Sport -0.68(0.48)
Constant 1.67(0.03)*** 1.87(0.12)***
n 151 150
Psuedo r2 0.03 0.12
Wald χ2 5.00** 14.85***
Deviance Goodness of Fit 53.81*** 50.25***
Pearson Goodness-of-fit 50.71*** 48.06***
significantly higher with the sport prime (t = 2.21 in specification (1) and t =
2.07 in specification (2)). The coefficient for males is positive but not statisti-
cally significant (t = 1.54). The coefficient on age is statistically significant (t =
-2.28) indicating that younger participants were more likely to be dishonest.3
In order to verify the results, table 5.4 reports the results of a poisson regres-
sion4in which the dependent variable is the number of wins and the indepen-
dent variables include a dummy for sport framing, a dummy for male, age,
3For more on the role of age and anti-social behaviour in sport see Kavussanu, Seal and
Phillips (2006).
4 Where p? < 0.1, p?? < 0.05, p??? < 0.01
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a dummy for student, a dummy if the student said they were experienced
in sport (this information is only available for those in the sport frame) and
the 5 measures of life satisfaction(not reported here). Specification (1) simply
includes the sport dummy while specification (2) includes all variables. We
note that the findings of the OLS regression seem to be upheld.
5.7 Discussion
The current study found that people were more likely to be dishonest if they
were primed to think about sport than education. More specifically, the self-
reporting of participants given the education priming were statistically in-
distinguishable from a binomial distribution, suggesting honesty, while the
self-reporting of participants given the sport prime were skewed to the right,
suggesting dishonesty. Our findings are evidence that merely thinking about
sport can result in increased dishonesty. This reinforces the notion that dis-
honesty and anti-social behaviour in sport is about more than ‘some athletes
who cheat’. The culture and attributes of sport may well bring out dishonest
behaviour.
A question that our study cannot address is why sport leads to increased
dishonesty. Our theoretical analysis suggested that there are particular as-
pects of sport that make it easier to justify anti-social behaviour or cheat and
maintain positive self-concept. This would suggest that it is inevitable there
would be more dishonesty in sport that other domains. We cannot, how-
ever, rule out that we observed increased dishonesty because of the partic-
ular culture and views of sport that prevail at the moment in the UK. For
instance, thinking about sport may make someone think about the dishon-
est behaviour they observe in sport and then be less honest in our experi-
ment. Most likely, though, is that these two processes reinforce each other.
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Specifically, sport leads to more dishonesty because of its particular aspects
which then leads people to associate sport with more dishonest behaviour
which, in turn, makes them more likely to be dishonest. Kavussanu, Roberts
and Ntoumanis (2002), for example, argue that anti-social behaviour in sport
is strongly influenced by behaviour in one’s own team and the norms that
become predominant over time (see also Ntoumanis, Taylor and Thøgersen-
Ntoumani 2012).
The picture is further complicated by the fact that individual characteris-
tics influence dishonest behaviour and also interact with factors that may
mediate dishonesty (Grosch and Rau 2017). For instance, Ntoumanis and
Standage (2009), applying self-determination, find that controlled motivation
was a strong predictor of anti-social attitudes. This means that athletes who
are motivated by extrinsic reward and external pressures are more likely to
engage in cheating. Motivation, however, is not entirely a static, individual
characteristic but also partly dynamic. Coaches, parents and team-mates, for
example, can help instil intrinsic motivation. Dishonest behaviour is also in-
fluenced by beliefs. Zelli, Mallia and Lucidi (2010), for example, find that
doping intentions amongst adolescents are strongly influenced by beliefs.
Moreover there are interesting interaction effects between factors, including
the idea that someone who has a more positive attitude to doping may be
more influenced by others (Zelli, Mallia and Lucidi 2010). Participation in
sport may also make someone less moral in other areas of life (Kavussanu
and Ntoumanis 2003) creating a further feedback loop.
The complex causes of anti-social behaviour in sport suggest a need for well
designed policy intervention. If participation in sport, of itself, increases dis-
honesty then it further undermines the merits of a policy simply aimed at
catching and punishing cheats. Instead we need to think about the whole
culture around sport and, in particular, the support around young athletes
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(Ntoumanis, Taylor and Thøgersen-Ntoumani 2012). Crucially, it may also
be beneficial to recognise the incentives to be dishonest and have an open
discussion about ethical dilemmas (Roberts and Ntoumanis 2002). This is
a complex issue because any move towards recognising the inherent incen-
tives to dishonesty may be interpreted as condoning dishonesty. It would





In this thesis we looked at rationality in individual decision making. In that
context, rationality essentially equates with maximizing expected payoff. We
have extended the notion of rationality to encompass strategic interdepen-
dence. The crucial thing this adds to the story is the importance of beliefs. In
particular, we can expect that athlete’s behaviour will be highly dependent
on beliefs about the actions of others, and to fully capture these beliefs we
need to model the actions of others.
In Chapter 2 we focused upon the Doping decision that may be taken by
players in a game. We provided a generalized model that included the ex-
pected utility of undertaking a doping decision, all facets of the decision and
broke down the expected utility from doping into its component parts and
looked at the specific aspects of strategic interaction. One of the basic as-
sumptions surrounding strategic interaction is that a person forms correct
beliefs about the actions of others. This consistency of beliefs fits within the
concept of rationality. However, optimal decision making for expected util-
ity maximization will depend upon the accuracy of each individual agents
belief structures and the analysis of beliefs will inevitably bring out the inter-
dependence between athletes.
The importance of beliefs is formally captured within game theory by the
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concept of Nash equilibrium and it’s generalizations. The basic idea behind
Nash equilibrium is that everyone: (a) maximizes their payoff given their be-
liefs about the likely actions of others, and (b) has correct beliefs about the
actions of others. Note that neither (a) nor (b) on its own is enough for equi-
librium because means an athlete is doing ‘something wrong’. For instance,
it is not in an athlete’s interest to act on the belief that no others will dope if
others are going to dope. Nash equilibrium captures, therefore, the inherent
payoff interdependence between individuals.
One important thing to appreciate is that while the Nash equilibrium cap-
tures the notion that nobody does ‘anything wrong’ it does not mean that
nobody has regrets. In equilibrium everybody maximizes their expected pay-
off. In hindsight an athlete may regret the choice they made. For instance,
the athlete who is caught doping may have made the right choice, because
the probability of being caught was very small, and yet still regret the choice
they made, because they were caught. Nash equilibrium is, therefore, an ex-
ante rather than ex-post concept of equilibrium. This is an interesting thing
to keep in mind when interpreting the views of those caught doping. While
they may claim remorse and regret we should not underestimate the likeli-
hood that they took the ‘right choice’ at the time and only regret their actions
because they came out unlucky.
With that in mind let us tackle some of the main criticisms of the game the-
oretic approach. The main criticism of game theory stems from its reliance
upon highly stylized and simplified models of reality. The primary defence
of this critique is one that we have already rehearsed, namely that models
should be judged on their insight and not their assumptions. A game theo-
retic model is not designed in any way to be faithful reproduction of reality.
It is designed to have just enough realism to reveal novel findings and it is
the natural tool with which to capture the strategic inter-dependence that is
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at the heart of sport.
It is not difficult to come up with complex games that more closely capture
reality than those considered in the literature. Typically, however, complex-
ity only serves to obscure insight. The prisoners’ dilemma, for instance, is
as simple a game as one can imagine but that very simplicity allows us to
make incredibly general conclusions about the consequences of doping. In
a similar manner. Chapter 3 boils down the all pay contest with N players
down to its simplest form with threshold analysis, To criticize these models
for their simplistic nature to miss the point. Studying the simplest prisoners’
dilemma outcome tells a significant amount about the incentive structure of
the individuals competing and allows us to derive testable predictions. More
complex games can give additional insight but do not seem to overturn the
conclusions derived from studying the prisoners’ dilemma.
A related criticism of these models are the parameterization of outcomes and
probabilities. Consider again, for instance, the figure 2.1. Our prediction of
behaviour is based upon the the value of W,p,q,HS. Without definitive mea-
sures we will have to rely upon the stylized facts derived from assumptions.
In order to counter this, we do not assume that athletes consciously work out
a value they are willing to put on, say, premature death. All we require is that
athletes behave in a consistent way. If athletes are behaving in a consistent
way, and we would suggest they do most of the time, then there is a number
that accurately measures the value they place on health. The much bigger
problem, therefore, is discerning what this number might be.
In this regard we acknowledge that the game theoretic model of doping
needs to improve. The models considered in the literature and in this thesis
make assumptions about the factors influencing the doping decision and the
strength of those factors without much recourse to the relevant psychologi-
cal and sociological evidence. This is a concern. It only serves to highlight,
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however, the complements between different approaches to studying dop-
ing in sport. In particular, game theory gives predictions based on modelling
assumptions, and it is vital those assumptions are based on sound evidence
and the predictions are tested in a robust way. This suggests the need for a
truly integrative social science of doping in which game theoretic, psycho-
logical and sociological approaches build on each other, rather than being
seen as substitutes
We also need to recognize that a game theoretic model is only as good as
its assumptions. To elaborate at this point consider a (non-game theoretic)
model proposed by Petróczi and Aidman (2008). In their model, doping
grows out of habitual engagement with acceptable performance enhancing
practices. Moreover, their model recognizes the influence of the social, polit-
ical, economic and culture environment. For example, the more athletes use
medical interventions the more readily they might accept using illicit sub-
stances. Seemingly consistent with this view, it also seems that athletes are
more ‘accepting’ of drug use to recover from injury (e.g. Anshel 1991) and so
the boundaries between legitimate and illicit use may become blurred.
The model proposed by Petróczi and Aidman (2008), and others like it, fo-
cuses on the influences an athlete is subject to. That is quite different to a
game theoretic model which focuses on how an athlete will react to the in-
fluences they face. These two modelling approaches should be seen as com-
plementary rather than substitutes. Therefore, a game theoretic approach
is naturally suited to answering a different set of questions to, say, a soci-
ological approach. Game theory is particularly valuable in modelling the
consequences that result from the incentives and influences faced by athletes
however it does not have anything to say about what those incentives and
influences might be.
Therefore, in future work we would need to incorporate more elements of
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behavioural economics in order for us to fully understand the costly, albeit
rational, decisions of agents to use doping decisions. One method may be
to look into payoff structures and the impact that loss aversion and other
elements of prospect theory have upon competitors actions within a game.
Whilst we feel that a contribution to the literature has been made in Chapter
2 by organizing a generalized model and analyzing its composite parts, more
aspects of the doping decision could be looked at in the future.
In Chapter 3 we characterized a two stage game in which players first choose
how much to dope and then choose how much effort to exert in training. The
combination of ability, doping and effort determined a player’s score and be-
cause of the way the competition was structured inside a All-Pay framework.
Using an application of Siegel (2009) we were able to obtain general insight
on the incentives to dope.
The key contribution of this chapter was to propose a more generalized model
that can be applied widely and is not restricted to particular functional forms
in order to help design policy objectives. As previously mentioned, the lit-
erature in this field is primarily designed contest theory and limited to fairly
specific functional forms or models that include strong assumptions such as
homogeneity which may not be realistic.
Furthermore, the strong assumptions of contest theory make it a challenge
to obtain an approach that can generally yield insight or help design policy
around. We would argue that our approach offers flexibility and tractabil-
ity which allows the model to be easily applied to look at a range of policy
interventions. However, one thing to mention is that the chapter is seen as
complimentary to the contest theory papers, not as a direct substitute for the
technical analysis demonstrated in these papers.
With that being said, there are some drawbacks to the approach undertaken.
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Whilst the fundamental assumption of the model we outline in Chapter 3 sur-
rounding the separation between doping and effort might seem like a reason-
able assumption to make, the assumption that doping decisions are common
knowledge before athletes choose effort might be pushing the boundary of
realistic assumptions. It could be justified by the notion that athletes gener-
ally have a good idea of what other athletes behaviour generally is in their
field and have a strong inclination of other athletes actions surrounding ille-
gal activities might be, but there would probably need to be further research
into whether or not this is actually the case in most amateur and professional
sports.
In Chapter 4 we compared a contest with a winner-take-all prize structure to
one with a linear prize structure both theoretically and experimentally. We
also compared a setting which primed for monitoring of output to one with
no monitoring to observe whether there were higher incidences of cheating
under no monitoring as would be expected from Our theoretical results. Our
theoretical assumptions also suggested that output would be higher with the
winner-take-all prize structure rather than a linear prize structure. our find-
ing is not too dissimilar to that of Sheremeta (2011) and gives additional cre-
dence to the analysis from that paper.
In the experiment, we found that effort was lower with the winner-take-all
the first time subjects did the task but higher the second time they performed
the task. This we suggest is linked to higher levels of cheating observed in
the second round of the experiment. One explanation for why we did not
observe higher output the first time subjects performed the task is risk aver-
sion and that may be something interesting to incorporate into future ex-
periments. However, we did not find any statistically significant differences
between the all-pay structure and the linear structure of payoffs.
The main implication we would take from our study in Chapter 4 is the need
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to take into account the ability to monitor output when designing contest in-
centives. If output can be perfectly monitored and high effort is considered
desirable then the prize structure that maximizes output is ideal. One draw-
back is that if output is imperfectly monitored, If that is the case then in order
to induce and incentivize effort we may have to incentivize cheating, In that
case we suggest that the linear prize structure, which minimizes cheating,
may be optimal even though it leads to lower output.
In Chapter 5 we analysed the effect that framing had upon peoples willing-
ness to cheat. Specifically, we tested the claim that a person may be less hon-
est in the sporting environment than they would be in other areas of their life
and that a sporting environment is so competitive that it causes additional
dishonesty to be present in comparison to everyday environments.
In order to test this, we applied the social cognitive theory of moral action
and the theory of self-concept maintenance to argue our point. We also re-
ported on an experiment designed to test our main hypothesis that the sport-
ing environment makes people dishonest. In the experiment, subjects un-
dertook a standard coin-tossing task in which there is the opportunity to be
dishonest. The subject was paid based on his or her self-reporting of ten coin-
tosses, therefore there was an incentive for the participant to misrepresent
their ’true’ outcome by artificially inflating the number of positive results in
order to increase their payoffs.
Our treatment variable was a priming task that subjects performed before
the coin-tossing task where around half of the subjects were given a series of
three questions asking them to think about their experience with sport while
the other half were gives questions about education.
We found significantly higher payoffs following the sport priming in com-
parison to the education priming, which suggests higher levels of dishonesty
in the former. This would also suggest that merely thinking about sport can
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result in increased dishonesty and that the culture and competitive nature of
sport may lead to higher levels of dishonesty and cheating.
Despite the result, we cannot answer why sport leads to increased dishon-
esty, which could be something to look for in future research. Our theoret-
ical analysis suggested that there are particular aspects of sport that make
it easier to justify anti-social behaviour or cheat and maintain positive self-
concept but that in and of itself may not provide a satisfactory answer as
to why dishonesty increases with a sport priming. Another issue that com-
plicates the result is that individual characteristics that influence dishonest
behaviour also tend to interact with factors that may mediate dishonesty. In
future research we may need to find a way to disentangle these motivations
in order to provide a clearer result.
Furthermore, whilst the chapter makes an important first step in exploring
whether sport, of itself, makes people more dishonest. We found a highly
statistically significant effect due to priming but it is still only one study. In
future work it would be desirable to explore this question further by, for in-
stance, distinguishing between competitive athletes and the general public
or between young and old. It would also be interesting to see whether the
extent of the sport priming is stronger and weaker for different personality
types and whether this correlates with general attitudes to morality. Finally,
we need to further quantify the extent of dishonesty. In our experiment dis-
honesty increases with the sporting prime but participants are still far from
being as dishonest as they could.
Overall, we feel we have made a decent contribution to the literature through
these chapters. However, we do note that there is still a significant amount
of work to be done in order to fully understand the rationality behind why
individuals decide to undertake costly doping decisions and why there is-









The experiment will consist of two parts (and a questionnaire). This is part 1.
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose one of the two parts
of the experiment and pay you based on your performance in that part. So,
please read the instructions carefully.
On your table you will find a Record Sheet and a booklet containing 10 mazes
like the one below. Please do not look at the mazes in the booklet until in-
structed to do so.
At the front of the room will be a clearly displayed clock counting down from
10 minutes.
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Your task is to complete as many mazes as possible from the booklet within
the 10 minutes. A maze is completed if you correctly identify an unob-
structed path through the maze from one arrow to another. Once you have
completed a maze please write down on your record sheet the time remain-
ing as displayed on the clock. For instance, if you finish the first maze with
8m 45s showing on the clock then write 8m 45s next to maze 1 on your record
sheet.
Once you have completed a maze and recorded the time please move onto
the next maze. Note that you are free to draw on the maze if you want but
all we require you to do is write down the time on the record sheet. [In order
that we can verify the maze was completed please indicate the correct route
on the maze. Note that we do not need this to be neat or tidy. We just need
to see that you found the correct path.]
Once the 10 minutes are up we ask you to record on the record sheet the total
number of mazes that you completed. Your performance will then be com-
pared to five other randomly selected people taking part in the experiment.
You will be given a rank from 1st (completed the most mazes) to 6th (com-
pleted the least). Note that in the event of a tie, where you complete the same
number of mazes as someone else, it will be randomly determined who has
the higher rank of the two of you.
If you are paid for this part of the experiment then you will receive a payment
based on your rank, as follows:
If ranked 1st you will get £20.
If ranked 2nd, 3rd, 4th, or 5th, you will get £5.
[If ranked 1st you will get £10. If ranked 2nd you will get £9.
If ranked 3rd you will get £8. ‘If ranked 4th you will get £7.
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If ranked 5th you will get £6. If ranked 6th you will get £5. ]
In part 2 of the experiment the maze task will be repeated. Everything re-
mains the same except that there will be a new set of 10 mazes to solve.
Again, we would like you to record the time remaining when you complete
a maze on the record sheet.
In part 1 of the experiment your rank was
The number of mazes completed by the highest ranked person was
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The experiment will consist of two parts (and a questionnaire). This is part 1.
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose one of the two parts
of the experiment and pay you based on your performance in that part. So,
please read the instructions carefully.
On your table you will find a Record Sheet and a booklet containing 10 mazes
like the one below. Please do not look at the mazes in the booklet until in-
structed to do so.
At the front of the room will be a clearly displayed clock counting down from
10 minutes.
Your task is to complete as many mazes as possible from the booklet within
the 10 minutes. A maze is completed if you correctly identify an unob-
structed path through the maze from one arrow to another. Once you have
completed a maze please write down on your record sheet the time remain-
ing as displayed on the clock. For instance, if you finish the first maze with
8m 45s showing on the clock then write 8m 45s next to maze 1 on your record
sheet.
Once you have completed a maze and recorded the time please move onto
the next maze. Note that you are free to draw on the maze if you want but
all we require you to do is write down the time on the record sheet. [In order
that we can verify the maze was completed please indicate the correct route
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on the maze. Note that we do not need this to be neat or tidy. We just need
to see that you found the correct path.]
Once the 10 minutes are up we ask you to record on the record sheet the total
number of mazes that you completed. Your performance will then be com-
pared to five other randomly selected people taking part in the experiment.
You will be given a rank from 1st (completed the most mazes) to 6th (com-
pleted the least). Note that in the event of a tie, where you complete the same
number of mazes as someone else, it will be randomly determined who has
the higher rank of the two of you.
If you are paid for this part of the experiment then you will receive a payment
based on your rank, as follows:
If ranked 1st you will get £20.
If ranked 2nd, 3rd, 4th, or 5th, you will get £5.
[If ranked 1st you will get £10. If ranked 2nd you will get £9.
If ranked 3rd you will get £8. ‘If ranked 4th you will get £7.
If ranked 5th you will get £6. If ranked 6th you will get £5. ]
In part 2 of the experiment the maze task will be repeated. Everything re-
mains the same except that there will be a new set of 10 mazes to solve.
Again, we would like you to record the time remaining when you complete
a maze on the record sheet.
In part 1 of the experiment your rank was
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